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Abstract 
 
Children’s Reasoning about Violations of Authenticity 
 
Brooke Jessica Schepp, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 
 
Supervisor:  Jacqueline D. Woolley 
 
When do children begin to realize that the authenticity of an object is not inherent 
to an object itself, but instead depends on the information one has about the object in 
question?   In two studies I investigated elementary school children’s reasoning about 
authenticity violations.  How we reason about authenticity violations, or cases in which 
the purported history of an item is shown to be false, is important in that it provides an 
example of how people can reason about the underlying, non-obvious features of objects.  
Participants (N= 64, ages 7-9) were first asked to rate the value of a series of everyday 
objects using a Likert scale (one to ten).  Next, information about the individual history 
of these objects was presented and participants were asked to re-rate them and provide 
explanations for their ratings.  Using a between-subjects design, participants were then 
informed that the information they had been given about the objects’ histories was the 
result of intentional deception (Study One) or a mistake (Study Two) and were again 
asked to re-rate the objects and provide explanations for their ratings.  Results from value 
ratings and explanations from both studies indicate that elementary school children are 
sensitive to the authentic nature of objects as well as intentional and accidental violations 
 vi 
of authenticity.  I propose that reasoning about associative essences, a novel term 
described in this paper, can be productively examined using violation of authenticity 
paradigms, providing insight into the development of reasoning about authenticity. 
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Introduction 
 
 Rembrandt’s painting “The Man with the Golden Helmet” enjoyed a privileged 
status in West Berlin’s Staatliche Museum until 1985.  Seated on a pedestal and 
surrounded by velvet curtains, tourists would come by the busload and stand in line three 
rows deep to see the painting in person.  It was considered by many to be Rembrandt’s 
best work, referred to by museum staff as “The Male Mona Lisa” and “The Pride of 
Berlin” (Debs, Morel, Friedman, & Manley, 2004).  Despite this rich history, in 
December of 1985 the painting was abruptly moved. It was taken from its private room 
and placed in the corner of a large hallway gallery. The tourists stopped showing up, and 
the painting slowly faded from the public eye.   
How should we interpret this change in status and public perception?  The 
painting had not suffered any physical damage.  Instead, the painting was discovered to 
not be an authentic Rembrandt.  The painting was not a forgery, there was no deliberate 
deception or motive in this case.  Art historians and critics were simply mistaken in their 
original analysis of the painting.  The painting lost value because it lost the association 
with Rembrandt himself.  As one Berlin newspaper wrote about the incident, “Nice 
picture, but the aura is gone” (Debs, Morel, Friedman, & Manley, 2004).  
 There are many aspects of this story that are unique, but it is by no means unusual 
from a psychological perspective.  In fact, the considerable body of work on object 
cognition has demonstrated that although we often reason about the obvious external 
perceptual features of objects such as appearance and function, we also judge objects 
based on features that are perceptually invisible, such as history and origin (Gelman, 
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2003).  Objects that are thought to carry special significance that is not based on obvious 
external features (such as the painting mentioned above) are referred to as authentic 
objects.  Authentic objects are characterized by a current or historical link with a person, 
place, or time of some significance (Frazier & Gelman, 2009).  Evidence for preferential 
bias for authentic objects is pervasive: we visit museums to see famous works of art, 
collect memorabilia from favorite actors, and treasure personal objects from our 
childhood  (Frazier & Gelman, 2009; Bloom, 2004; Hood, 2009; Hood & Bloom, 2009).  
Research has demonstrated empirically that adults rate authentic objects (in all forms) as 
having a higher value than identical inauthentic objects, and that they are more desirable 
to keep, to own, and even simply to touch (Frazier, Gelman, Wilson, & Hood, 2009).  
Adults also use authenticity in their judgments of artwork, rating actual pieces of artwork 
as more valuable than identical duplicates (Bloom, 2004) and this effect is particularly 
strong in adults who had a strong emotional bond with either a security blanket or 
favorite stuffed animal when they were children (Frazier et al., 2009).    
An object’s authenticity can even surpass its value based on perceptual features 
alone.  For example, we may think nothing of discarded chewing gum based on outward 
appearance, but we can also look beyond obvious perceptual features when presented 
with information about its unique history. In fact, used chewing gum purportedly from a 
celebrity has sold for hundreds of dollars on eBay (Silverman, 2004).  It follows that 
importance of an object’s authenticity holds true even when it comes to perceptually 
identical objects.  A watch worn by President Obama would be worth more than an 
identical watch worn by a non-famous individual. For Authentic objects, having the 
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original is what is of primary importance.  After all, an exact replica of the Mona Lisa 
would still not be the Mona Lisa, even if it were perceptually identical to the original. 
One characteristic of authenticity that has yet to be examined is that authenticity 
is not inherent to an object.  Instead, it depends entirely on that object’s individual 
history.  In the case above, we see that a painting supposedly gained “Rembrandt-ness” 
during its creation, but it lost this essence and its associated value when authenticity was 
violated.  What happens when we discover the authenticity of an object to be violated?  
What happens when we find out that the supposed link between the object and its history 
does not exist?  The following studies aim to address this question, as well as identify the 
cognitive mechanisms supporting authenticity. This is significant because, as shown in 
the above example, finding out that a painting is a forgery does more than decrease its 
value, it changes the way people see and think about the painting.  I propose that children 
and adults reason about authenticity in terms of associative essences, or ‘essences’ that 
are attached to an object through an association with a previous owner.    
Cognitive Basis for Reasoning about Authenticity: Associative Essences 
When The Man With the Golden Helmet was discovered not to be an authentic 
Rembrandt, the public responded as though the painting had lost its value. This suggests 
that we perceive authenticity as something that an object can gain or lose.  I propose that 
authentic objects are valued because we perceive them to contain an associative essence, 
which I define to mean an intangible remnant of their previous surroundings or owners. 
An associative essence therefore provides a perceived connection between the history of 
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the object and the object itself, and in turn these objects are valued because of these 
intangible connections.   
Differences Between Associative Essences and Object Essences  
Associative essences are distinct from other kinds of essences. These associative 
essences are different from the object essences spoken of in relation to theories of 
essentialism, which is the belief that certain categories (e.g., dog, female) have an 
underlying reality to them that helps to define their category membership (by acting as an 
underlying defining characteristic that only members of a category share) and that cannot 
directly be observed (Gelman, 2004).  Object essences are inherent to an object, extend to 
all members of a given category (in fact they can serve to define the category itself) and 
are unchanging (Gelman, 2003; 2004).  An associative essence differs on all of these 
measures.  An associative essence is an essence that an individual object has gained only 
by association with a person or place of some significance, and is therefore not inherent 
to any given object.  Similarly, associative essences do not extend to all members of a 
single category and are instead unique to an individual object that has ‘obtained’ the 
essence through its origin or history.  For example, a bowl has an intrinsic object-essence, 
a “bowl-ness” that we would describe as being inherent to the object, but a cup owned by 
Abraham Lincoln has an additional quality, an associative essence or “Lincoln-ness”, that 
would not extend to identical bowls, and makes that particular bowl special and unique.   
Perhaps the most important difference between object essences and associative 
essences is that unlike object essences, which due to their inherent nature are difficult to 
change, associative essences are more malleable.  For example, the painting The Man 
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with the Golden Helmet had a “Rembrandt-ness,” and then suddenly it did not.  The art 
world is not the only place where we can see a change in the associative essence of an 
object.  A napkin signed by a celebrity becomes more than just a napkin, but would lose 
its favor if you found out that it was actually signed by someone else.  This tendency is 
further revealed in the language we use to describe such situations.  In this case we would 
say that the signed napkin was a ‘fake’ even though we agree that the napkin itself is real.  
What is actually ‘fake’ is the connection between the napkin and the celebrity, which had 
been gained by the object and was then lost.  
Evidence for Associative Essences 
Evidence for the concept of associative essences can be found in popular culture.  
Many popular television shows and movies deal with the idea that a deceased individual 
can leave a trace of him or herself on a location or in an object that continues to exist 
long after the individual is gone.  A case in which this occurs is in children’s movies, 
such as Titan A.E. and The Lion King, in which a character (or the audience) takes 
special note of the fact that the place where the character is currently standing is the same 
place that his father must have stood many years ago. Another example is that a celebrity 
charity, which allowed individuals to bid on dresses and other items worn by celebrities, 
dropped the complimentary dry cleaning that they often offered in addition to the item 
because no one ever wanted the items washed.  The fact that the bidders preferred the 
items to not be cleaned seems to indicate that they thought that there was something that 
could be washed off, whatever essences the celebrity left on the item (Hood, 2009). 
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This last example highlights that even though these associative essences are a 
human construct, they do have a shred of truth to them.  The field of forensic sciences is 
based on the idea that people leave traces of themselves everywhere they go.  Whether it 
is hair, blood, or even fingerprints, whatever we leave is often enough to be able to be 
used by law enforcement to narrow the suspect down to a single individual.  Much like 
intuitive microbiology, in which it just so happens that our idea of contagion transfer 
lines up with how actual contagion transfer occurs, associative essences are both an 
intuitive concept and a real concept that is reinforced in our daily lives.   
A recent paper published by Newman, Diesendruck, and Bloom (2011) expanded 
on this concept by introducing the idea of a celebrity contagion, a concept consistent with 
associative essence.  Celebrity contagion may be understood as a kind of associative 
essence in that it seeks to describe how and why celebrity possessions are valued over 
similar, non-celebrity owned objects.  They explain preference for objects owned by 
celebrities by appealing to the theory of contagion, a form of magical thinking in which a 
person’s immaterial qualities or essence can be transferred to an object through physical 
contact (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994) and that that even after the contact between the owner 
and the object has ended, there still exists an internal linkage between the two (Nemeroff 
& Rozin, 2000).   
The contagion concept forms a particular subset of associative essences.  One 
quality shared by both associative essences and contagions is that they are both brought 
about through the interaction of an individual with an object (either through ownership or 
physical contact). However, contagions have an additional property that is not shared by 
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all objects that contain an associative essence: An additional ‘power’ that has the ability 
to influence a secondary person coming into contact with the object. As an example, 
religious Catholics may travel to Lourdes for two similar yet separate reasons. The first is 
to see a place where they believe a miracle has occurred, the second is to receive the 
power of spiritual healing from the site. Contrast this behavior with the idea that many 
Americans might be interested in touching something that once belonged to George 
Washington, but they do not believe they will gain anything (e.g., healing, a better 
understanding of democracy) by coming into contact with it. An implication of this is that 
people think that a transformation needs to occur in order to rid an object of a 
contaminant (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994), but that a transformation is not necessary when 
the authentic object does not have an extra ‘power’ to influence the individual.  For 
example, when The Man With the Golden Helmet was found not to be a Rembrandt, it did 
not go through any such transformation to lose its authenticity.  This seems to imply that 
while some associative essences can pass on an additional contagious quality, this is not 
generally the case.  Associative essences may simply be lost, whereas contagions must be 
purged by a deliberate action.  Contagion can pass along with an associative essence, but 
there can be associative essences without a contagion-quality. In this way, celebrity 
contagion, as well as any psychological contagion, is a specific kind of associative 
essence.  
Alternative theories and contributing factors for reasoning about 
authenticity 
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 Additional theories have been proposed for why people value authentic objects 
other than through associative essences.  However, recent research has shown that even 
though these theories may be able to explain aspects of reasoning about authenticity, they 
cannot fully explain how we conceive of authenticity (Newman, Diesendruck, & Bloom, 
2011).  One popular idea is that authentic objects are valued purely because of their 
associations with individuals, and not because we feel they contain the essences of those 
individuals.  In other words, one alternative theory could be that we favor these objects 
because they remind us of a certain person, time, or place, without actually having any 
sort of perceived ‘connection’ or containing any kind of invisible ‘essence’ of the owner.   
There is some support for this proposal.  Nemeroff and Rozin (1994) found that 
‘symbolically’ altering a sweater that had been in contact with an evil being (e.g., by 
slashing it with a knife) as compared to physically altering a sweater (e.g., by laundering 
it) had more of an effect on increasing the participant’s willingness to wear the sweater.  
This was seen to be supportive of the possibility that individuals did not want to wear the 
sweater that had been in contact with an evil individual, not because they believed that it 
contained a contaminant, but because they felt that wearing the sweater would imply 
approval or acceptance of the individual or his actions or a desire for closeness and 
sharing with him.  
This result may have been partially driven by the methodology used by the 
experimenters. In the experiment, participants were given a number of responses that they 
could choose from (including physical cleaning, destroying and defacing, opposite-
valence contact, and temporal separation). Due to the forced-choice nature of this 
 9 
methodology, it is possible that researchers did not include as an option the choice that 
most people would have selected had they been able to provide their own responses.  One 
concern is that researchers did not include any ‘religious’ or ‘spiritual’ methods of 
cleaning the garment (e.g., having the object blessed by a priest), because this particular 
behavior is actually seen in people who are confronted with this type of contagion. 
Interestingly, this notion of ‘spiritual-cleansing’ was brought up by the participants 
themselves in their verbal responses. Specifically, although participants chose a type of 
‘alteration’ that the researchers felt was in support of a symbolic or mere-association 
model, the language used by the participants suggests something closer to associative 
essences.  For example, one subject claimed “I just don’t want to be around him or his 
objects…because he’s given it cooties, not that I think he has cooties, but he’s just a nasty 
person and oozes nastiness” and “that he could somehow transmit... somehow the object 
would pick up some negative-ness” (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994).  This language suggests 
that reasoning about associative essences may have played a role in participant responses.  
 Additional evidence against the ideas that association is the primary driver of 
authenticity is that items associated with negative figures, as well as positive figures, are 
similarly valued  (Newman, Diesendruck, & Bloom, 2011).  If we favor authentic objects 
because they remind us of the owner, than items associated with negative figures should 
not be valued at all.  As the trade of serial killer memorabilia on the Internet 
demonstrates, this is clearly not the case.  Researchers determined that whereas adult 
participants reported liking objects that had been associated with positive figures and 
disliking objects associated with negative figures, this did not influence the value that 
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they gave to the objects.  In other words, measures of liking and disliking did not predict 
measures of value, thus demonstrating that mere associations are not responsible for our 
favoring of authentic objects (Newman, Diesendruck, & Bloom, 2011).   
 Another possible contributing factor for why we value authentic objects is that our 
opinions are driven by market values.  In other words, it is possible that we like objects 
that belonged to celebrities not because we feel that they contain traces of that celebrity, 
but because we think that we could sell them for an increased price or because we feel 
that owning the objects would garner social respect and impress other people.  Even if 
this was the case it begs the question of why we feel that other people would want to be 
in possession of the objects in the first place. In other words, even though we may value 
an object because we think we can sell it to someone else, it still doesn’t explain why that 
other individual would want to buy it in the first place. In this way, market value cannot 
be the ultimate cause of our favoring authentic items in that it only serves to ‘pass on’ the 
problem rather than solve it outright.  Additionally, there is the problem that even though 
this might hold true for celebrity possessions; this explanation does not take into account 
all authentic items (Newman, Diesendruck, & Bloom, 2011).  For example, children who 
have lost a favorite stuffed animal are known to refuse identical copies (Hood, 2009), and 
research has demonstrated that children are aware that even though they prefer their 
possessions to identical copies, these items are not appropriate for a museum (Frazier & 
Gelman, 2009).   
Additional evidence against the theory that market value is the primary driver of 
our desire for authentic objects is that we perceive authentic objects differently depending 
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on their degree of contact and relationship with their owner (Newman, Diesendruck, & 
Bloom, 2011).  For positive celebrities, increasing the amount of contact that the 
individual had with an object increased the desire participants had to wear the sweater.  
For negative celebrities, the opposite was true, decreasing the amount of contact between 
the individual and the object increased the participants’ willingness to wear it. When 
researchers highlighted contact between the negative individual and the sweater, 
participants were typically unwilling to wear the sweater (Newman, Diesendruck, & 
Bloom, 2011).  In the study, market value did play a role in participants’ decisions of 
whether or not they would purchase the sweater in question (possibly with the goal of 
reselling it), however it did not play a role in the willingness of participants to wear a 
sweater. This indicates that whereas market value may play a small role in the way we 
think about authentic objects, it does not provide a comprehensive explanation of 
authenticity (Newman, Diesendruck, & Bloom, 2011).   
Researching Authenticity Violations 
If associative essences are the cognitive mechanism by which we understand 
authenticity, then manipulating their presence or absence should influence people’s 
perceptions of the authenticity of objects. It follows that cases in which the authenticity 
of an object has been violated would be a unique context for studying authenticity more 
generally.  Authenticity is dependent upon our knowledge about an object, and can 
therefore be added or removed as we gain information about the interactions that an 
object has had with specific people or places. If we find out that the link between an 
object and its history does not exist then a violation of authenticity can be said to have 
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taken place that can be cognitively understood as a loss of associative essence. In other 
words, it could be that when an object that was thought to be authentic is found to be a 
violation, it loses the ‘essence’ of the individual that the owner left upon it, and along 
with that the sense of connection between the history of that object and ourselves is lost.  
Developmental Research on Authenticity 
Whereas Piagetian theories argued that young children were restricted to making 
judgments based only on outward perceptual appearance and functionality (Inhelder & 
Piaget, 1964), recent research from related studies has begun to demonstrate that even 
preschool aged children may have strong concepts of authenticity, and that the capacity to 
reason about authenticity may be early developing.  Gelman and Ebeling (1998) gave 
preschoolers simple drawings and asked them to identify the pictures.  Those who were 
told that the pictures were created intentionally (e.g., painted by an individual) said that 
the paintings were of something meaningful (e.g., a bear).  Children who were told that 
the pictures were created by accident (e.g., someone spilled paint) did not attribute the 
same meaning to them, and often described the pictures in terms of the material they were 
made out of (e.g., paint).  A recent study found that when children were asked to identify 
objects that were described as either being man-made or accidentally created, children as 
young as three were more likely to indicate the item was an artifact (e.g., ‘knife’) for the 
man-made object and more likely to identify the material (e.g., ‘plastic’) when the object 
was believed to be accidentally created (Gelman & Bloom, 2000).  Additional studies 
have demonstrated that although perceptual appearance and function often play a role in 
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the way elementary school children name objects, an object’s history can also play an 
important role in how it is named (Gutheil, Bloom, Valderrama, & Freedman, 2004).   
Children also demonstrate reasoning about authenticity through their attachment 
to security objects.  In the U.S., around one-half to two-thirds of children form strong 
emotional bonds with objects such as blankets and stuffed animals.  This behavior 
typically emerges as early as the first year of life and does not begin to decline until 
around six years of age (Passman,1987).  These attachment objects, like all other 
authentic objects, have the characteristic of being irreplaceable.  In studies in which 
children thought that experimenters were able to ‘copy’ objects using a special machine 
(in reality it was only an illusion), most three-to-six-year-olds rejected the copy of their 
security object in favor of keeping the original.  Additionally, there were a number of 
children who refused to allow a duplicate to even be made of their attachment object 
(Hood & Bloom, 2008).  This ‘copy machine’ methodology was used in additional 
studies to demonstrate that children are sensitive to authenticity in objects beyond their 
personal items. Researchers demonstrated that while children were willing to take home 
objects that they believed were ‘copies,’ they rejected a copy of an item that they 
believed belonged to a famous individual, choosing only the original object as the one 
they would like to own (Hood & Bloom, 2008). 
Additional research by Frazier and Gelman (2009) has shown that children 
between the ages of three and ten are able to identify that authentic objects belong in a 
museum whereas inauthentic copies do not, and that this information was separate from 
how much the children personally wanted the object. However, children showed 
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developmental differences in how they treated different types of authentic objects.  After 
reasoning about personal items, the next type of authenticity that children seem to 
recognize concerns memorabilia.  Children demonstrated an appreciation for objects that 
had gained authenticity earlier than for objects with unique origins.  It was not until age 
five that children began to identify that objects with unique origins (e.g., the first teddy 
bear) belonged in a museum. They were also able to identify that while they may not 
personally prefer objects with unique origins (e.g., because a newer teddy bear might 
look nicer than the first one ever created) that these objects did belong in museums.  
Present Studies 
I propose that investigating how children reason about authenticity violations will 
provide additional insight into artifact cognition and how children reason about 
associative essences. Other researchers have noted the lack of research on topics related 
to authenticity violations.  In his book Descartes’ Baby, Paul Bloom proposed that 
forgeries, a type of authenticity violation, could be the most dramatic example of the 
importance of origin.  He stated that our understanding of how and why humans focus on 
the origins and history of an object would be improved if we knew how young children 
think about forgeries (Bloom, 2004).   
In two studies I examine how children evaluate objects that they once believed to 
be authentic, but were then found to be inauthentic.  I hypothesize that children are 
sensitive to the authentic nature of objects and that children are sensitive to situations in 
which authenticity is violated.  I predict that children will find objects that have 
undergone a violation of authenticity to be less appealing than authentic objects. In the 
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first study children rated a number of objects and then re-rated them after information 
about the authenticity of those objects had been established. The children were then 
informed that a deliberate deception had taken place and were then asked to re-rate the 
objects.  A second study was conducted with a nearly identical protocol, shifting the 
focus of the violation away from a deliberate deception by presenting the authenticity 
violation as a mistake instead of a lie. This was done in order to ensure that the ratings 
children gave to the objects after the violation were the results of associative essence lost 
and not because of a negative reaction to the deception.  
Stimuli Development and Design 
  Types of Authentic Objects 
 It was important to determine the proper kind of authentic objects to use in this 
study.  Even though it was likely that all children would be familiar with authentic 
personal items (such as a personal blanket or a teddy bear from home) studying these 
objects was not ideal as the children would have had to bring these objects to the study.  
Additionally, research has demonstrated that whereas children value their own objects, 
they know that other people do not value these objects.  Research has also demonstrated 
that children are sensitive to objects that gain authenticity earlier than they are sensitive 
to objects that are a special creation (Frazier & Gelman, 2009).  For this reason, I chose 
to focus on memorabilia as the authentic objects to use in these studies.  
  Historical and Modern Figure List 
 It was important that the participants were familiar with the individuals that were 
said to ‘own’ the objects.  Rather than choosing the figures for the participants, I 
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compiled a list of modern and historical figures and then asked the parents of the 
participants to pick out modern and historical figures in advance that they thought their 
children would recognize.  Pilot testing demonstrated that parents and children could 
correctly identify the individuals on the list of modern and historical figures.  Only three 
children struggled with identification of a historical figure, and only one child struggled 
with identification of a modern figure.  Throughout the duration of the pilot testing and 
the formal studies themselves, this figure list was updated in order to take into account 
famous individuals known by the individual children. The list of historical and modern 
figures can be seen in Appendix C.  
Experimental Objects 
 Four objects (a bowl, an oven mitt, a slinky, and a small stuffed animal) were 
chosen for use in this study.  These objects were chosen because even though they were 
all objects that children would recognize, none of them were especially noteworthy or 
desirable. During pilot testing a number of older children noted that it was not possible 
that historical figures such as George Washington could have owned the slinky, as plastic 
slinkys were not available at that time. Because of this it was determined that the bowl 
and the oven mitt would only belong to the two historical figures while the slinky and the 
stuffed animal would be reserved for the modern figures.  A representation of the objects 
used in this study can be seen in Figure 1.  
Value Scale 
 During pilot testing, children were given ten counters to use to represent values.  
Children were asked to push counters forward in order to indicate the value of the 
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previously mentioned objects.  This procedure worked well with the older children, but 
the counters were often a distractor for the younger children.  Because of this, in the final 
protocol a number line was used instead of counters.  Even though the children in the age 
group I chose for this study did not have difficultly using the counters, I wanted to be 
able to use this methodology with younger children in future studies. This necessitated 
the changing of the counters to a number line.  
  
 18 
Study One 
The objective of Study One was to determine how children reason about cases of 
deliberate authenticity violations.  Children rated a series of objects over the course of 
three trials, initial, authentic, and deception, with each trial defined by the children 
receiving additional information about the authenticity status of the objects.  Specifically, 
after giving the objects an initial baseline rating in the initial trial, children were informed 
of the authenticity of the objects in the authentic trial, followed by a deception trial where 
this authenticity was determined to be false.  At each trial the children were asked to 
provide a value rating for the objects and to give an explanation for that value rating.   
I predicted that children’s ratings of the objects would increase once informed that 
a famous individual had once owned the objects in question.  Additionally, I 
hypothesized that information about this ownership would trump all other perceptual and 
functional information when participants were assessing the value of the objects, even if 
they previously used those features to justify their ratings.  Thus, I expected a clear 
change in the content of the explanations provided by the children across conditions.  
For value ratings and explanations after the authenticity violation was revealed, I 
predicted that children would be sensitive to the deception about the history of the object 
presented in the deception trial, and that this would be demonstrated by a decrease in the 
value rating of the object after the deception was made clear.  I predicted that there would 
be a corresponding change in the content of the explanations provided by the children, 
with responses moving away from a focus on the ownership of the item and instead re-
focusing on the features that had been the focus in the beginning of the study.  
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Methods 
Participants  
Thirty-three typically developing children (thirteen female and twenty male) 
between the ages of seven years and nine years (7,00 to 9,11, M = 8,5) were included in 
this study.  Children were recruited from the Austin Children’s Museum and The 
University of Texas Children’s Research Laboratory.  
 I chose to focus these studies on children seven to nine years of age.  This age 
group was selected based on previous literature documenting developmental differences 
in children’s understanding of authenticity and value.  Importantly, research using a 
similar methodology found that consistent concepts of fame and value did not fully 
develop until age six (Bloom & Hood, 2008).  Because reasoning about authenticity 
violations is dependent upon children understanding of both of these concepts, seven to 
nine year olds were chosen as the ideal starting point for this study.  
Materials 
The objects used in this study included household items that children were 
familiar with.  These included a bowl, an oven mitt, a slinky, and a small stuffed animal.  
Additionally, children saw six practice objects including a necklace, a paperclip, a pen 
cap, a cup, and two stuffed animals.  To rate the objects, children used a number line 
printed horizontally on a piece of paper.  This number line spanned from one to ten, with 
notches representing these numbers placed equidistant from each other across a solid line. 
Children were also shown laminated pictures of the modern and historical famous figures 
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that were used in the study. Whenever the experimenter mentioned a famous figure to a 
child, the corresponding picture was shown.  
Procedure 
Children were asked to rate a series of objects using a number line spanning from 
one to ten, with higher numbers indicating a higher value.  The same four objects (a 
bowl, an oven mitt, a slinky, and a small stuffed animal) were seen and rated by all 
participants.  Participants were asked to rate each object a total of three times, each time 
having been given additional information about the history of the object.  
 Pictures of the famous individuals were shown to the participants three times 
over the course of the study. First, a picture was shown when the experimenter was 
introducing the famous figure to the child. This was done in order to give the child a 
greater chance of identifying the figures. For example, many children were unfamiliar 
with the name “Daniel Radcliffe,” but they were able to identify him as the actor who 
played Harry Potter in the Harry Potter movies once they were shown his picture. 
Second, the picture was shown to the children during the experimental trial when the 
experimenter was claiming that the experimental object belonged to that individual. For 
example, when the experimenter claimed that a slinky belonged to Daniel Radcliffe, she 
also showed a picture of Daniel Radcliffe. This was done both to stress the ownership of 
the object as well as to serve as a reminder to children of who the figure was.  Lastly, the 
pictures were shown to children during the trial where they were informed that the figure 
in question was not the owner of the object. This was done in order to serve as a reminder 
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to the child as to who the figure was as well as to keep this trial consistent with previous 
ones.  
Informed Consent and Parent Interview 
During the consent process, the experimenter interviewed the parents about which 
famous modern and historical figures their children were familiar with.  The 
experimenter provided the parents with a pre-established, age-appropriate, pilot-tested list 
of famous historical and modern figures for them to choose from.  The list was based on 
age-appropriate history lessons as well as Kids Choice Awards and other lists of modern 
figures that were popular among children in this age group.  If a parent was not able to 
provide a figure from the list the experimenter used whatever off-list figures the parent 
thought were appropriate.  Once a parent suggested a figure it was added to the list that 
was given to subsequent parents. In this way, the list remained comprehensive and up-to-
date. This became especially important when it came to identifying famous sports players 
that children might be familiar with.  
Introduction of the Modern and Historical Figures 
Using information from the parental interview as a guide, the experimenter began 
by showing pictures of famous individuals (e.g., George Washington) one at a time to the 
participants and then asking if they knew who the figures were.  If the participants could 
properly identify a figure, they were then prompted by the experimenter to provide 
information about him or her. For example, if participants correctly identified a picture of 
George Washington, they were then prompted to give some information about him (e.g., 
“That’s right! What can you tell me about George Washington?”).  
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If a child was not able to identify a picture, or if she gave an incorrect response, 
the experimenter provided the name of the figure to the child (e.g., “This is George 
Washington, did you know that?”) If the child answered in the affirmatory, the 
experimenter would once again prompt her to provide information about the figure by 
asking, “What can you tell me about George Washington?” If the child still did not 
recognize the individual by his or her name or picture, and could not give an adequate 
explanation about the identity of the individual, then the experimenter disregarded that 
particular figure and moved on to the next figure on the list.  This process was continued 
until each child had successfully identified two historic and two modern figures.  In this 
way, participants were given several chances to communicate their knowledge of the 
figure, and a figure was only rejected after the experimenter had given multiple cues.  As 
in the pilot study, parents were successful in identifying figures that would be familiar to 
their children.  Sample pictures of famous figures can be seen in Figure 3.  
Training for Rating the Value of Objects Using the Number Line  
The experimenter explained to the participants that they would be asked to rate a 
series of objects using a number line, in which higher numbers represented a higher value 
and lower numbers represented a lower value.  The experimenter then demonstrated the 
use of this number line by rating three objects representative of differing value, a 
necklace (high value), a paperclip (low value), and a stuffed animal (medium value).  
Children were introduced to these objects as follows: “Look at this!  This is a necklace!  I 
bet this is worth a lot, so I’m going to say that it is worth ten, because that is the highest.  
Look at this!  This is a paperclip!  I don’t think that this is worth very much so I’m going 
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to say that it is worth one, because that is the lowest.  Look at this!  This is a stuffed 
animal!  While this stuffed animal is definitely worth more than the paperclip, I don’t 
think that it is worth as much as the necklace so…I’m going to say that it is worth five, 
because that is right in the middle.”  Each time the experimenter gave a value rating to a 
number, she pointed to the corresponding number on the number line.  Often the children 
pointed along with the experimenter as she indicated the numbers on the number line, and 
some children also voiced their opinions about how they would have rated the objects 
similarly or differently (e.g., “I would have said that it is worth four”).  These objects 
were placed on the table one at a time and were always presented in the same order.  The 
experimenter purposefully did not give justifications for the value ratings in order not to 
bias the content of the explanations given by the children later in the study.  
Following this demonstration, participants were asked to show proficiency using 
the number line while rating a separate set of objects (e.g., “Ok. Now it is your turn.  I’m 
going to place an object on the table, and I want you to tell me how much you think it’s 
worth by pointing to a number on the number line.  Ok?  Let’s go!”).  The experimenter 
placed three practice items (a cup, a pen cap, and a stuffed animal) one at a time on the 
table and asked the children how much they thought that the object was worth (e.g., 
“Look at this!  This is a cup!  How much do you think this cup is worth?  Show me by 
pointing to a number on the number line!”). If a child did not immediately respond, the 
experimenter prompted her by saying, “Remember, ten is the highest and one is the 
lowest” and “There are no right or wrong answers.  I just want to know what you think 
about this.” After participants indicated a numerical value rating (either by physically 
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pointing to a number on the number line or by giving a verbal response) the experimenter 
asked them to provide a reason as to why they rated the object the way they did by asking 
“Why do you think it is worth that much?” All children were able to provide an answer 
using this one to ten scale, and all children were able to generate explanations to justify 
their ratings.  
Initial Trial 
In the initial trial participants provided a baseline rating for the four experimental 
objects chosen for the study: a plain white ceramic bowl, a red polka-dot oven mitt, a red 
plastic slinky, and a pig stuffed animal in a superhero costume.  The order of the object 
presentation was randomized for each child, and this order was kept constant throughout 
the study.   
The experimenter began the initial trial by announcing to the participants “Ok, 
now I’m going to show you some different objects.” The experimenter than continued by 
placing an object (e.g., the bowl) on the table and saying, “Look at this.  This is a bowl.  
How much do you think this bowl is worth? Show me using the number line.” If a child 
had difficulty responding or did not answer immediately, the experimenter added 
“Remember, the higher numbers mean that something is worth more and the lower 
numbers mean that something is worth less.” Once the participants indicated a value to 
the experimenter they were asked, “Why do you think it is worth that much?” to give an 
opportunity for them to explain how they rated each of the individual objects.  This 
process was repeated for all four of the experimental objects, with value rating 
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information (from the number line) and explanatory information collected for each of the 
objects independently.  
Authenticity Trial 
The experimenter began the authenticity trial by saying, “Now I’m going to tell 
you a bit more about these things.” She then presented each of the objects again in the 
same order as in the initial trial, this time informing the participants that the objects 
belonged to the figures that were previously discussed.  For example, the experimenter 
would say, “Now I’m going to tell you a little more about this bowl.  This bowl belonged 
to George Washington.” At this point the experimenter would show the picture of George 
Washington to reinforce the idea that this is the individual who had owned the object.  
The experimenter then informed the children of how much they had rated the object 
during the initial trial, and asked them to rate it again (e.g., “Before you told me that this 
bowl was worth five. Now how much do you think the bowl is worth?  Is it worth the 
same as it was before, more than it was before, or less than it was before? Show me using 
the number line.”).  After the children had given the rating, the experimenter asked, 
“Why do you think it is worth that much?”  Once the children had given new value 
ratings and new explanations for all four of the experimental objects, the experimenter 
informed them that she needed to go and grab something from another room, but that a 
new woman (i.e., confederate) would be in shortly.   
Deception Trial 
When the second experimenter entered the room she reintroduced herself and 
informed the participants that the deception had taken place.  She said, “So I was just 
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talking with (name of first experimenter) who you were talking to, and I have some bad 
news.  She told you that some of the things that you saw belonged to some people, but 
that actually isn’t true. It was actually a lie. She knew that these things did not really 
belong to those people; she knew it the whole time.  She told you a lie and she did it on 
purpose.”  Following this discussion, the children were asked to re-rate the experimental 
objects.  For example, the experimenter would place the bowl on the table and say, “Do 
you see this bowl?  Before (name of the first experimenter) told you that it belonged to 
George Washington, but she lied to you, and it doesn’t” To further illustrate this point the 
experimenter also showed the picture of the famous figure being discussed and then 
removed it from the table out of view.  The participants were informed of how they had 
rated the object during the authenticity trial and were asked to re-rate the objects for a 
third time (for example, “Before you said that this bowl was worth ten.  Now how much 
do you think this bowl is worth?  Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was 
before, or less than it was before?  Show me using the number line.”).  Once the children 
had re-rated the object, they were asked, “Why do you think it is worth that much?” This 
gave the children a chance to explain why they changed, or didn’t change, their rating of 
the objects.  This procedure was repeated for all four of the experimental objects.  Each 
study was videotaped in order to ensure accuracy in coding.  A complete script can be 
found in Appendix A.  A table of the study design can be seen in Figure 2.  
Coding 
Number Line Scores 
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Numerical responses that the children gave to indicate the worth of each of the 
objects were separated into three groups: initial scores (i.e., value ratings that the children 
gave before they were informed of the authenticity of the object), authentic scores (i.e., 
value ratings that the children gave to the objects when they were told of the famous 
associations), and deception scores (i.e., value ratings that the children gave the object 
once they had been informed of the deception). These numbers were recorded 
individually for each of the four experimental objects.  
Explanatory Categories  
 Explanations were recorded during the experiment using a video camera and were 
later coded by an experimenter.  Children were asked to give an explanation each time 
they gave a rating for an object across all three trials.  During each trial the children rated 
four objects, meaning that each child provided twelve explanations over the course of the 
experiment.  
 Explanations were coded into three primary categories: obvious, non-obvious, and 
non-explanatory.  Obvious explanations focused on obvious external features of the 
object, such as the function of an object  (e.g., “Because you can play with it or stretch 
it”) or perceptual features (e.g., “It probably costs a lot because it’s really big”).  Included 
in this category were explanations that stated that the object in question was ‘common’ or 
not unique because it was plain or because there existed many similar objects in the 
world (e.g., “It’s just a bowl and it doesn’t come with anything”).  
 Non-obvious explanations focused on non-obvious internal features of objects, 
such as information about an object’s unique history or origin.  This included 
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explanations that discussed the presence or absence of a famous owner (e.g., “Because it 
was Miley Cyrus’s and she’s really famous”), but also included explanations that 
discussed the age of the object or its rarity (e.g., “Because George Washington died a 
long time ago so his bowl is kind of old”).  Perceptual information alone could not have 
conferred information about history and ownership. For the children to have included 
these details in their explanations they must have valued the information about an 
object’s history, and considered it of importance.   
 Explanations that did not fit clearly into the obvious or non-obvious categories 
were coded as non-explanatory responses.  These explanations included cases in which 
children either did not provide an answer (by saying “I don’t know”) or gave a non-
explanatory response (e.g., “Because it’s not as good as ten and it’s not as bad as a one”).  
A table showing examples of these response types is provided (Table 1).   
Inter-rater reliability was established using a randomly selected sample of 25% of 
the explanatory data.  Two research assistants independently coded the reliability sample 
with 88% agreement.  Reliability was calculated for explanatory coding categories for 
obvious, non-obvious, and non-explanatory categories with a kappa score of .80.  
 
Results 
 
 I hypothesized that children would be sensitive to information about the 
authenticity of objects, and that they would value objects that they thought were authentic 
and then devalue them once this information was shown to be false.  I predicted that 
children’s authentic value ratings would be higher than initial ratings and that while 
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explanations in the initial trial would focus on obvious features such as perceptual 
features and function, after children were informed about the authenticity of the objects 
their explanations would shift to focus on the past owner as the key cause of the value 
increase.  Once children were informed that the information that they had received about 
the authenticity of the objects was in reality the result of a deliberate deception on the 
part of the experimenter, I hypothesized that their deception value ratings would decrease 
as compared to the authentic value ratings.  Additionally, I predicted that children would 
abandon their authentic explanations in light of the authenticity violation, and would 
instead return to explanations that focused primarily on the obvious features of the 
objects for the deception trial, or that they would provide answers relating to the 
authenticity violation (e.g., Because George Washington didn’t really own it).  
 First I examined value ratings across the three trials. I will compare the initial 
scores to the authentic scores and the authentic scores to the deception scores. I will then 
examine the content of the explanations in order to show how they relate to the value 
scores given by the children in the study. 
Value Ratings 
 A repeated measures ANOVA  (in which trial type is the within subject variable 
with three levels: initial, authentic, and deception) was conducted to compare the effect 
of authenticity status on value rating scores for the test objects used in the experiment.  
This demonstrated that there were significant differences in the value ratings of the 
objects across trial (F(2, 64) = 69.86, p < .001 η2 = .693).  In order to determine where 
these differences lie, paired t-tests were performed between the trial scores.  T-tests, 
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completed with a Bonferroni correction to control for Type one Errors, showed that the 
mean trial scores were significantly different from each other.  Value ratings across trials 
can be seen in Figure 4.  
Initial to Authentic Scores 
 I predicted that due to the malleability of associative essences objects would 
easily change from inauthentic to authentic.  I therefore expected that children’s value 
ratings of the objects would increase from the initial trial to the authentic trial. A paired t-
test between the initial and authentic scores demonstrated that the value ratings were 
significantly different from one another (t(32) = 8.44, p < .001).  Specifically, the mean 
values for the authentic scores (M = 8.17, SD = 2.21) were significantly higher than the 
mean values for the initial scores (M = 5.44, SD = 2.32).  This demonstrates that children 
were sensitive to the authentic information and that they valued the objects more when 
they were determined to be authentic.  
Authentic to Deception Scores 
 After the children were informed that the experimenter had deliberately deceived 
them about the history of the objects, their value ratings for the objects dropped 
significantly (t(32) = 9.64, p < .01) from 8.17 (SD = 2.21) to 5.09 (SD = 2.20).  This 
demonstrates that children place more value upon an object when they believe it to be 
authentic, but that same object loses its value when that authenticity is called into 
question.  This supports the theory that children reason about authenticity in terms of an 
associative essence that can be gained or lost from an item depending on what 
information is known about that object.  
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Initial to Deception Scores 
 Interestingly, the deception scores for the objects were marginally different from 
the initial scores (t(32) = 2.45, p = .059).  Specifically, while the initial scores had a mean 
of 5.44 (SD = 2.32), after they had been informed of the deception the mean deception 
scores dropped to 5.09 (SD = 2.20).  Although this result was only marginally significant, 
this seems to indicate that after the intentional deception children found the objects less 
appealing than they initially did before the presentation of the authentic information.  
 As is always the case with means, it is possible that the results shown above could 
be driven by particular extreme cases within the data set. In order to address this 
possibility, I calculated the number of children who changed their scores for three or 
more of the items across the three trials. 72.7% of participants increased their value 
scores for the objects between the initial trial and the authentic trial. Similarly, 75.0% of 
participants decreased their value scores for the objects between the authentic trial and 
the deception trial. This demonstrates that a majority of children changed their value 
scores and that the results are not driven by a few aberrant cases.  
Explanation Scores 
I hypothesized that children’s explanations would reveal reasoning about 
authenticity.  Specifically, children would reason about obvious features prior to 
obtaining information about the history of the objects, but their explanations would 
change to incorporate non-obvious information once the authenticity of the objects was 
brought to light.  Similarly, I hypothesized that children’s explanations would return to 
focusing upon obvious features once the authenticity violation was revealed, indicating 
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that the object had returned to an inauthentic status.  However, I also predicted that 
children might take the opportunity to include information concerning the non-authentic 
status of the objects in their explanations.  I therefore hypothesized that even though 
explanations in the deception trial would trend towards obvious responses, that there 
would be a number of responses that could be described as non-obvious.  
 A 3(trial) X 2(explanation type) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
compare the effect of authenticity status on response type. Explanation scores for the 
individual objects were combined in order to create a summary score for response type. 
Scores were coded as ‘Obvious’ if they included a reference to an obvious feature (e.g., 
feature or function) and ‘Non-obvious’ if they referred to a non-obvious feature of an 
object (e.g., ownership). Within each category participants could receive a score of 0-4 
depending on how many responses of each type were given. As shown in Figure 5, there 
was a significant interaction between trial and explanation type (F(2,64) = 83.705, p < 
.001 η2 = .723).  
Obvious Explanation Scores 
A repeated measures ANOVA examining the number of obvious responses across 
the three trials demonstrated that here were significant differences in the frequency of 
obvious explanations across trials (F(2,64) = 63.763, p < .001 η2 = .666). Further 
examination of the data revealed that obvious responses were most frequently provided in 
the initial trial (M = 3.58, SD = .87) and were less frequent in the authentic trial (M = 
0.67, SD = .87; t(32) = 12.78, p < .001). Obvious responses were also given significantly 
more in the deception trial (M = 2.70, SD = 1.53) as compared to the authentic trial (t(32) 
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= -6.77, p < .001). Interestingly, there were also significant differences in the number of 
obvious scores given in the initial trial as compared to the final score (t(32) = 3.38, p < 
.005) 
Non-Obvious Explanation Scores  
A repeated measures ANOVA examining the number of non-obvious responses 
across the three trials demonstrated that here were significant differences in the frequency 
of non-obvious explanations across trials (F(2,64) = 76.999, p < .001 η2 = .706). Further 
examination of the data revealed that non-obvious responses were never provided in the 
initial trial (M = 0.00, SD = .00) but were the most frequent type of explanation in the 
authentic trial (M = 3.12, SD = 1.45; t(32) = -12.344, p < .001). Non-obvious responses 
were also more prevalent in the authentic trial as compared to the deception trial (M = 
1.00, SD = 1.25; t(32) = 7.206, p < .001).  As with the obvious explanations, there was 
also a difference in the non-obvious explanations in the deception trial as compared to the 
final trial (t(32) = -4.596, p < .001). 
Explanation results within the Initial Trial 
 In the initial trial children were significantly more likely to give obvious 
explanations  (M = 3.58, SD = .87) as compared to non-obvious explanations (M = 0.00; 
t(32) = 23.689, p < .001). In fact, children did not reason about the history or the origins 
of any of the objects during the initial trial.  This demonstrates the saliency of obvious 
features in guiding explanations.  
The content of the obvious explanations in the initial trial focused almost entirely 
on perceptual features of the object (M = .69, SD = .287) such as material (e.g., “Because 
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something that’s glass, it’s breakable”), color (e.g., “It has polka dots and it’s red”), or 
size (e.g., “Cause it’s big.  I like big slinkys”).  Also included in this category were 
explanations that compared one of the objects to any of the others (e.g., “even though it’s 
bigger than the bowl, it’s not as valuable.”).  Another type of obvious explanation 
concerned the functional use of the object (M = .31, SD = .27).  For example one child 
said that the bowl would be highly valued, “because it can hold cereal and other things.” 
Obvious explanation found in the initial trial also focused on the commonality of the 
objects (M = .06, SD = .15), or the fact that the objects were not rare or unusual.  For 
example, participants pointed out that “There’s tons of bowls” and “because there are lots 
of oven mitts. Oven mitts are not rare.”  
Even though there were no responses that could be classified as non-obvious in 
the initial trial, there were a number of responses that did not fall into either the obvious 
or non-obvious categories (M = .11, SD = .22) and were therefore placed in the non-
explanatory category.  Most of the responses that did not fit into either category were 
non-explanatory in nature, in which children stated that the objects were worth the 
amount indicated “because it wouldn’t be that expensive but not that cheap either” or 
“because it would be like sort of in the middle except a little bit more.”  Other responses 
that were included in the non-explanatory category include children who claimed that 
they didn’t know why they had given the object a particular rating.  Only one child failed 
to produce an explanation (by saying that she didn’t know) for only one of the objects 
during the initial trial.  
Explanation results within the Authentic Trial 
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 Results for the explanation data for the authentic trial reveal that children changed 
the content of their explanations when they were given information about an object’s 
authenticity. Whereas explanations in the initial trial almost exclusively concerned 
obvious qualities of the objects, children’s explanations in the authentic trial focused 
primarily on non-obvious qualities.  Children were significantly more likely to give non-
obvious explanations (M = .3.12, SD = .1.45) in the authentic trial as compared to 
obvious explanations (M = .67, SD = 1.08; t(32) = -5.942, p < .001). 
 Explanations referring to the history of the objects accounted for a significant 
number of explanations given during the authentic trial (M = .78, SD = .19).  Included in 
this subset of explanations were a significant number of explanations that indicated that 
the child had increased her ratings specifically because the objects belonged to or had 
been directly used by famous individuals (M = .49, SD = .35).  For example, some 
children merely stated, “Because he was really famous,” to explain why they gave an 
object a high value rating, but other children gave more in-depth responses that 
demonstrated that they were increasing their ratings of the objects not just because it had 
been associated with the famous figure, but because that that famous figure had interacted 
with the object directly.  For example, “Because he was our first president of the United 
States and to know that…it was used by George Washington…it would probably be 
worth a ten!” 
 Another interesting subcategory within the authentic explanations included 
explanations that involved the age or perceived rarity of the objects (M = .07, SD = .14).  
A majority of these were given for the objects associated with historical characters (M = 
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.12, SD = .28) as compared to the objects associated with modern characters (M = .02, SD 
= .09).  For example, one child gave an object a high value rating “because George 
Washington was the first president, and it’s a very old bowl, and it’s historic.”  Another 
subcategory, seen only for the objects associated with the modern figures, included 
comments that the modern figures were not as famous as the historical figures (M = .12, 
SD = .25).  For example, “because she’s not as famous as some of the other people, but 
she’s still pretty famous.”  
 Some children gave obvious explanations instead of or in addition to non-obvious 
explanations.  Of these, responses that were feature based were the most common (M = 
.11, SD = .26). Some participants also gave function information (M = .04, SD = .11) and 
a few gave common explanations (M = .03, SD = .08).  Non-explanatory explanations, 
which did not fit into either category, were also relatively uncommon during the authentic 
trial (M = .09, SD = .20).  
Explanation results within the Deception Trial 
 The results for the explanation data for the deception trial reveal that children 
changed the content of their explanations once again when they were given information 
about a violation of authenticity.  While explanations in the authenticity trial focused 
primarily on non-obvious explanations, once children were informed of the violation of 
authenticity they once again focused their explanations on obvious features.  Children 
were significantly more likely to give obvious explanations (M =  2.70, SD = 1.53) in the 
deception trial as compared to non-obvious explanations (M = 1.00, SD = 1.25; t(32) = 
3.909, p < .001). 
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 The content of the explanations given in the deception trial was similar to those 
given during the initial trial.  Explanations referring to perceptual features of objects were 
the most common (M = .40, SD = .36).  For example, responses focused on the material 
of the object (“Because it still didn’t use that much material. It just used two different 
things: red paint and flexible stuff”), color, (“cause I like pink slinkys”), or size 
(“because…it’s not too tiny”).	  	  These explanations also referred to comparisons between 
objects (“because it’s not as valuable as a diamond but it is definitely more valuable that 
a paperclip”) and comparisons to how they had previously rated the objects (“Because 
last time I said it was eight”).  Obvious explanations also included references to the 
functional affordances of objects (M = .26, SD = .33), for example, “Because it can be 
used for cereal and other things” and “because you have to use an oven mitt to get things 
out of the oven so that you don’t burn your hands”.  Another type of explanation that was 
seen in the deception trial focused on the commonality of the objects (M = .13, SD = .24).  
For example, participants made note that “Because it’s basically…a plain bowl.  There 
are thousands of the same bowl” and “It’s not rare to have an oven mitt.”  
 Children also gave non-obvious explanations during the deception trial, however 
these non-obvious explanations were dissimilar to the ones given during the authentic 
trial. Rather than focusing on the authenticity of the objects, the non-obvious 
explanations given during the deception trial focused on the object’s inauthentic status (M 
= .26, SD = .32).  For example, children indicated that they had given the objects low 
value ratings, “because it does not belong to Albert Einstein,” “just because…it’s a plain 
bowl. Nobody bowl,” and “since it isn’t really Abraham Lincoln’s it goes back to it’s 
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original, to six.”  So while the participants were still reasoning about the owner of the 
given object, they were highlighting that the object had dropped in value because it no 
longer belonged to that famous individual.  There were also a number of non-explanatory 
responses. (M = .13, SD = .27).  For example, “because it wouldn’t be a ten, five, or one” 
and “because when you go to a store stuff costs a lot of money.” Other responses in this 
category include “I don’t know” and cases in which children did not give a response.  
Examples of these subcategories can be seen in Table 2.  
Summary of Explanation Results  
Taken together, these results show that there were overall differences in the types 
of explanations that participants gave during the initial, authentic, and deception trials. 
Specifically, whereas obvious responses dominated in the initial trial, children changed 
their explanations to focus on non-obvious features of the objects in the authentic trial. 
However, once informed of the inauthentic nature of the objects children returned to 
obvious explanations. While obvious responses were given in both the initial trial and the 
deception trials, children were more consistent in giving obvious responses during the 
initial trial.  This implies that while a majority of the children did return to obvious 
responses in the deception trial, a significant number of children were also reasoning 
about the inauthentic nature of the objects.  
Obvious responses, which dominated in the initial trial (M =.89, SD = .22) 
decreased significantly in the authentic trial (M = .17, SD = .36; t(32) = 12.779, p < .001).  
In the deception trial, after the violation of authenticity had been revealed, the number of 
obvious explanations increased significantly (M = .69, SD = .38; t(29) = -6.358, p < 
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.001).  Non-obvious responses, which were completely non-existent in the initial trial (M 
= .000) were the majority of explanations in the authentic trial (M = .78, SD = .36; t(32) = 
-12.34, p < .001).  After the violation of authenticity was revealed the number of non-
obvious responses dropped significantly (M = .26, SD = .32; t(29) = 7.17, p < .001).  
Information about the types of explanations given across trial can be seen in Figure 4.  
In total, 91% of children gave primarily obvious responses during the initial trial 
with the remaining children giving primarily non-explanatory responses or giving an 
equal number of non-explanatory and obvious responses.  None of the children gave non-
obvious explanations in the initial trial.  In the authentic trial, only 9% of the children 
gave primarily obvious responses.  A majority of children (76%) changed their responses 
to focus on non-obvious responses.  In the deception trial, a majority of children (64%) 
changed their responses to once again primarily focus on the obvious features of the 
objects. However, there were still a number of children (15%) who focused on non-
obvious features of the objects in the form or reasoning about the objects’ inauthentic 
status. Information about the percentages of explanation types given across trials can be 
seen in Table 3. 
Discussion 
 
This study determined that children are sensitive to changes in the authenticity 
status of an object, and react in ways that imply that they view authenticity as something 
that an object can gain or lose.  This view of authenticity supports the hypotheses 
concerning the role of associative essences in children’s understanding of authenticity.  
Specifically, when information about the authenticity of the object changed, the 
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children’s value ratings of the objects changed as well.  When an object gained 
authenticity the value rating of the object increased significantly, and when the 
authenticity of the object was said to be false its value ratings decreased significantly.  
This ability to see authenticity in terms of gain and loss seems to imply that there is an 
essential quality to the way that children view authenticity.  This was further supported 
by the sophisticated content of children’s explanations, which clearly indicated that they 
saw an object’s history as something that could add value to an object, whereas 
information about the inauthentic status of the objects was seen as something that 
decreased the object’s value.  
Interestingly, children’s value ratings for objects after the authenticity violations 
were marginally lower than the initial ratings given for the same object.  One possible 
explanation for this is that when an object loses its associative essence, it has a damaging 
effect on the object that it has been removed from. This is reminiscent of how adults view 
forgery.  Typically, objects that are found to be inauthentic are taken out of museums. If 
children are reasoning about authenticity in the same way as adults, than it is not 
surprising that they would show this type of thinking when it came time for them to rate 
objects that had undergone a violation of authenticity.   
One alternative possibility to explain these finding that children decrease the 
value ratings of objects in response to authenticity violations is that children were 
angered about being lied to by the experimenter, and that the negative emotions 
associated with this response served to decrease the scores in the deception trial.  So 
rather than decreasing the value ratings of the objects because they felt that the objects 
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lost value when they lost authenticity, they were decreasing their scores because of the 
unintended emotional consequences of the methodology.  It seems unlikely that this is the 
case, as the children in this study were not visibly upset after the revelation of the 
deception, but it could be possible that that children’s scores decreased from the 
authenticity trial to the deception trial because of the nature of the deception as a 
purposeful act, rather than because they felt that the objects lost value when they lost 
authenticity. In order to take this into account, I conducted a second study in which the 
deliberate deception was replaced with an accidental mistake on the part of the first 
experimenter.  This served to eliminate any tendency the children may have had to 
decrease the value of the object specifically because of the deliberate deception.  
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Study Two 
Study Two was designed in order to ensure that children were not reducing their 
ratings of the objects after the authenticity violation as a direct result of the deception, 
rather than being due to the removal of associative essences. To draw any conclusions 
about the roles of associative essences in understanding authenticity, it must be clear that 
the drop in ratings is not due to methodological concerns.  In order to accomplish this, in 
Study Two the authenticity violation was introduced as the result of a mistake instead of 
a lie.  Whereas in Study One the children were told that the experimenter purposefully 
lied, children in Study Two were told that the experimenter had made a mistake and that 
she was really sorry.  If children were only decreasing their scores due to the deliberate 
deception, than there should not be a similar drop in value ratings after the authenticity 
violation has been revealed.  However, if children decrease their value ratings in the face 
of an accidental event as well as a purposeful one, this lends credence to the idea that 
children are solely reasoning about the presence or absence of associative essences when 
they change their scores.  
The objective of Study Two was to determine how children reason about cases of 
accidental authenticity violations.  Using a methodology nearly identical to that used in 
Study One, children rated a series of objects over the course of three trials, with each trial 
defined by the participants receiving additional information about the authenticity status 
of the objects.  Specifically, after giving the objects an initial baseline rating, children 
were informed of the authenticity of the objects, followed by a trial in which this 
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authenticity was determined to be false.  As in Study One, at each trial the children were 
asked to provide value ratings for the objects and explanations for their value rating.   
The hypotheses for Study Two are identical to those in Study One.  I predicted 
that children’s ratings of the objects would increase once they were informed of the 
authenticity of the objects.  Additionally, I also hypothesized that information about this 
ownership would trump all other perceptual and functional information that the children 
had previously used in their explanations.  Thus, I expected a clear change in the value 
ratings of the objects as well as the content of the explanations provided by the children 
across conditions.   
I predicted that children would be sensitive to the authenticity violation, and that 
they would demonstrate this sensitivity by decreasing their scores as well as changing the 
content of their explanations after the mistake was revealed.  Specifically, children’s 
value ratings of the objects would decrease and their explanations would move away 
from a focus on the ownership of the item and instead re-focus on the obvious features 
that had been the focus in the beginning of the study.  
Methods 
Participants  
Thirty-one typically developing children (seventeen girls and fourteen boys) 
between the ages of seven years and nine years (7,03 to 9,10, M = 8,12) were included in 
this study. Children for Study Two were recruited from the Austin Children’s Museum 
and The University of Texas at Austin Children’s Research Laboratory. 
Materials 
 44 
As in Study One, children rated the same series of objects on a number line and 
were then asked to re-rate the objects once information about their authenticity was 
established.  As in the previous study, the authentic figures used in the study were chosen 
from a list by the parents of each child.  The same pictures of the authentic figures that 
were used in Study One were re-used in Study Two.  
Procedure 
The procedure in Study Two was identical to that in Study One with the exception 
of the deception trial.  During the deception trial in Study One, a second experimenter 
entered the room and informed the children that they had been purposefully deceived.  In 
Study Two, the children were informed that the first experimenter had made a mistake, 
but that she did not deliberately deceive the children about the history of the objects.  The 
second experimenter told the participants, “So I was just talking with (name of the first 
experimenter) who you were talking to, and I have some bad news.  She told you that 
some of the things that you saw belonged to some people, but that actually isn’t true.  It 
was actually a big mistake.  She really thought that those things belonged to those people, 
and she just found out right now that they really don’t.  She wanted me to tell you that 
she is really sorry.  She made a mistake, but she didn’t do it on purpose.”  
Following this discussion, the children were once again asked to re-rate all of the 
experimental objects.  For example, the experimenter would show the slinky to the 
children and say, “Do you see this slinky? Before (name of the first experimenter) told 
you that it belonged to Daniel Radcliffe, but she made a mistake and it doesn’t.” As 
before, a picture of the famous figure was shown to the children and then removed and 
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the children were informed of how they initially rated the object before being asked to 
give another rating.  Children were also given the opportunity to provide explanations as 
to why they changed (or didn’t change) their value scores.  A complete script can be 
found in Appendix B.  A table of the study design can be seen in Figure 2.  
Coding 
Coding in Study Two was identical to Study One.  Value ratings were recorded 
for all four objects over the initial, authentic, and deception trials.  Explanations were 
recorded during the experiment using a video camera and were later coded by an 
experimenter.  Children rated four objects across three trials, meaning that each child 
provided twelve value ratings and explanations over the course of the experiment.  
Explanations were coded into the three primary categories used in Study One: obvious, 
non-obvious, and non-explanatory.  Examples of these explanatory categories can be seen 
in Table 1.  
Inter-rater reliability was established using a randomly selected sample of 25% of 
the explanatory data.  Two persons independently coded the reliability sample with 84% 
agreement.  Reliability was calculated for explanatory coding categories for obvious, 
non-obvious, and non-explanatory categories with a kappa score of .76.  
Results 
 
 The same predictions from Study One held for Study Two.  In other words, I 
expected that children would be sensitive to the authenticity violation regardless of 
whether the nature of that violation was intentional or accidental.  I predicted that 
children’s authentic value ratings would be higher than the initial value ratings for all of 
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the objects that the children observed.  I also predicted that once children were aware that 
the authenticity of the object was false (even though it was an accident on the part of the 
experimenter and not a deliberate deception) that their value ratings would decrease as 
compared to those given to the objects in the authentic trial.  I further hypothesized that 
while explanations in the initial trial would focus on obvious features such as perceptual 
features and function, children would change their explanations to focus on the authentic 
nature of the object once information about that authenticity was presented.  Once 
children were told that there has been a mistake and the objects never belonged to the 
indicated individuals, I predicted that the content of their explanations would shift once 
again to focus on obvious rather than non-obvious features.  In sum, I conducted Study 
Two in order to confirm the results from Study One and in order to show that children 
were not decreasing their scores in response to the deception, but were in fact reacting to 
the loss of the associational essence.   
Value Ratings 
 A repeated measures ANOVA (where trial is the within subjects variable with 
three levels: initial, authentic, and deception) was conducted to compare the effect of 
authenticity status on value rating scores for the test objects used in the experiment.  This 
demonstrated that there were significant differences in the value ratings of the objects 
across the trials (F(2, 60) = 75.79, p < .001η2 = .716 ).  In order to determine where these 
differences lie, paired t-tests were performed between the trial scores.  The t-tests were 
completed with a Bonferroni correction to control for Type one Errors.  Once again, 
results showed that the mean trial scores were significantly different from each other in 
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line with my predictions and the results from Study one.  Value ratings across trials can 
be seen in Figure 7. 
Initial to Authentic Scores 
 Based on my hypotheses and the results from Study One, I predicted that 
children’s value ratings of the objects would increase from the initial trial to the authentic 
trial.  This would indicate that children are willing to revise their initial judgments of 
objects when presented with information about the prior history of an object.  This is 
exactly what was shown in the data.  A paired t-test between initial and authentic scores 
demonstrated that these value ratings were significantly different from one another (t(30) 
= 10.20, p < .001).  Specifically, the means for the authentic scores (M = 8.48, SD = 1.97) 
were significantly higher than the mean values given to the objects in the initial trial (M = 
6.01, SD = 2.34).  This demonstrates that the children valued the objects more after they 
were given information about the authenticity of the objects, which is in accordance with 
the results found in Study One.   
Authentic to Deception Scores 
 The data show that even though there was no deliberate deception on the part of 
the experimenter, children’s ratings of the objects still decreased significantly after the 
disclosure that they were not authentic (t(30) = 9.52, p < .001). The mean value ratings 
for the authentic objects had increased to 8.48 (SD=1.97) after information about the 
authenticity of the objects was presented.  After the researchers revealed that a mistake 
had occurred, the values dropped to a mean of 5.39 (SD=2.31).  Just as we found in Study 
One, children placed more value upon an object when they believed it to be authentic, but 
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that same object lost its value when that authenticity is called into question, even when it 
was the result of a mistake and not a deliberate deception.  
Initial to Deception Scores 
 The differences between the initial and the authentic value ratings were 
marginally significant in Study One.  In Study Two they were found to be significantly 
different from one another (t(30) = 2.84, p = <.05).  Specifically, although the initial 
rating scores had a mean of 6.01 (SD = 2.34), after children had been informed that the 
experimenter has been mistaken about the nature of the objects, the value ratings dropped 
to 5.39 (SD = 2.31).  This demonstrates that children found the objects less appealing at 
the end of the experiment than they initially did before the presentation of the authentic 
information.  
Explanation Scores 
 As in Study One, I predicted that children’s explanations would reveal reasoning 
about authenticity.  Specifically, I hypothesized that children would reason about obvious 
features prior to obtaining additional information about the history of the objects, but that 
their explanations would change to incorporate non-obvious information once the 
authenticity of the objects was brought to light. I also hypothesized that children’s 
explanations would return to focusing upon obvious features once the authenticity 
violation was demonstrated to the participants, but that children would also reason about 
the non-obvious features of the objects in terms of their inauthentic nature. .  
 A 3(trial) X 2(explanation type) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
compare the effect of authenticity status on response type. Explanation scores for the 
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individual objects were combined in order to create a summary score for response type. 
Scores were coded as ‘Obvious’ if they included a reference to an obvious feature (e.g., 
feature or function) and ‘Non-obvious’ if they referred to a non-obvious feature of an 
object (e.g., ownership). Within each category participants could receive a score of 0-4 
depending on how many responses of each type were given. This ANOVA demonstrated 
a significant interaction between trial and explanation type (F(2,60) = 142.351, p < .001 
η2 = .826).  
Obvious Explanation Scores 
A repeated measures ANOVA examining the number of obvious responses across 
the three trials demonstrated that there were significant differences in the frequency of 
obvious explanations across trials (F(2,60) = 74.670, p < .001 η2 = .713). Further 
examination of the data revealed that obvious responses were most frequently provided in 
the initial trial (M = 3.68, SD = .70) and were less frequent in the authentic trial (M = 
0.58, SD = 1.06; t(30) = 13.08, p < .001). Obvious responses were also given 
significantly more in the deception trial (M = 3.03, SD = 1.30) as compared to the 
authentic trial (t(30) = -7.57, p < .001). Interestingly, there were also significant 
differences in the number of obvious scores given in the initial trial as compared to the 
deception trial (t(30) = 2.81, p < .05).  
Non-Obvious Explanation Scores  
A repeated measures ANOVA examining the number of non-obvious responses 
across the three trials demonstrated that here were significant differences in the frequency 
of non-obvious explanations across trials (F(2,60) = 132.913, p < .001 η2 = .816). Further 
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examination of the data revealed that non-obvious responses were almost never provided 
in the initial trial (M = 0.03, SD = .18) but were the most frequent type of explanation in 
the authentic trial (M = 3.42, SD = 1.15; t(30) = -16.465, p < .001). Non-obvious 
responses were also more prevalent in the authentic trial as compared to the deception 
trial (M = 0.61, SD = 1.09; t(30) = 10.973, p < .001).  As with the obvious explanations, 
there was also a difference in the non-obvious explanations in the deception trial as 
compared to the final trial (t(30) = -2.89, p < .05). 
Explanation results within the Initial Trial 
 The results for the initial trial in Study Two are similar to those seen in Study 
One.  Children were significantly more likely to give obvious explanations  (M = .3.68, 
SD = .70) in the initial trial as compared to non-obvious explanations (M = .032, SD = 
.18; t(30) = 28.610, p < .001). The content of the obvious explanations in the initial trial 
were also similar to what was seen in Study One.  Participants focused almost entirely on 
the perceptual features of the object (M = .68, SD = .28) such as the material it is made of 
(e.g., “Because it looks like it was made out of glass”), color (e.g., “it’s an oven mitt and 
it has polka dots and it’s red”), and size (e.g., “Cause it’s big and long”).  There were also 
a number of explanations in which the features of multiple objects were compared (e.g., 
“Because it’s a little bit bigger than the stuffed animal”).  Other explanations focused on 
the functional use of the objects (M = .35, SD = .30), for example, “It’s something that 
you can use by...it’s something you can eat out of” and “people need it to get stuff out of 
the oven.” Children also gave explanations that focused on the commonality of the 
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objects (M = .10, SD = .15).  Participant responses in this category include “It’s kind of a 
common toy” and “because there’s tons of bowls.”  
As in Study One, there were a number of responses that did not fall into either the 
obvious or non-obvious categories (M = .08, SD = .18).  Most of the responses that did 
not fit into either category were non-explanatory, in which the children simply stated that 
the objects were worth the amount that she had indicated “Because I don’t think it’s ten 
but I think it’s worth a lot” or “because it would be like sort of in the middle except a 
little bit more.” Other responses that were included in this category include children who 
claimed that they didn’t know or children who failed to provide an answer.   
Explanation results within the Authentic Trial 
 The results for the explanation data for the authentic trial reveal that, just as in 
Study One, children changed the content of their explanations when they were given 
information about authenticity.  Rather than focusing their explanations on obvious 
features as they did in the initial trial, children’s explanations in the authentic trial tended 
to favor non-obvious qualities.  Children were significantly more likely to give non-
obvious explanations (M = 3.42, SD = 1.15) in the authentic trial as compared to obvious 
explanations (M = .58, SD = 1.06; t(30) = -8.25, p < .001). 
 Once children were informed of the authenticity of the object, their explanations 
changed to focus almost exclusively on the unique history of the object.  In fact, authentic 
explanations accounted for nearly all of explanations given during the authentic trial (M = 
.85, SD = .29).  While some of these explanations merely stated that the owner was 
famous, a significant number of explanations went beyond this simple response and 
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indicated that the ratings increased specifically because they belonged to or had been 
directly used by famous individuals (M = .52, SD = .36).  For example, while some 
children merely stated, “Because it was Miley Cyrus’s and she’s really famous,” and 
“because Albert Einstein is one of the most famous guys in the world,” other children 
provided more in-depth responses that demonstrated that they were increasing their 
ratings of an object because the famous figure had interacted with it directly.  For 
example, “because he was a really, really famous person and it would just be so cool to 
touch something that he touched” and “Since he was a president and it would be 
awesome to touch something a president touched and touch something a president had 
fooled around with and played with.”  One participant even noted that he hadn’t rated an 
object higher at the start of the experiment, “because I didn’t know who it belonged to at 
first so I thought it was just a regular slinky.”  Another noted that “cause Selena Gomez is 
like a really special person and if that slinky belonged to her then it would also be 
special.” 
 Other interesting responses included explanations that involved the age or 
perceived rarity of the objects (M = .10, SD = .18).  This type of response was only given 
for the objects belonging to historical figures  (M = .19, SD = .36) rather than the objects 
belonging to the modern figures (M =. 000).  For example, “Because George Washington 
was an important person and it’s hard to get things that belong to him” and “Because 
George Washington died a long time ago to his bowl it kind of old.” Another subcategory 
included explanations that some figures were not as famous as the others (M = .08, SD = 
.15).  This was seen exclusively for the modern figures (M = .16, SD = .30) and not the 
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historical figures (M = .000). For example, “he’s not like the most famous person in the 
world” and “Even though Selena Gomez isn’t that important to America, she’s pretty 
famous.”  
 Some children did give obvious explanations instead of or in addition to non-
obvious explanations.  Of these, responses that were feature based were the most 
common (M = .10, SD = .20). Some participants also gave function explanations (M = 
.06, SD = .11) and common explanations (M = .01, SD = .04).  Non-explanatory 
explanations were also relatively uncommon during the authentic trial (M = .09, SD = 
.21).   
Explanation results within the Deception Trial 
 Children once again changed the content of their explanations when they were 
given information about a violation of authenticity.  The pattern of explanations given by 
children in Study Two closely resembled what was seen in Study One, even though there 
was no deliberate deception.  While explanations in the authentic trial focused primarily 
on non-obvious explanations, once children were informed of the violation of authenticity 
they changed their explanations to re-focus on obvious features, as they had done in the 
initial trial.  Children were significantly more likely to give obvious explanations (M = 
3.03, SD = .1.30) in the deception trial as compared to non-obvious explanations (M = 
.61, SD = 1.09; t(30) = 7.711, p < .001).   
 The content of the explanations given in the deception trial was similar to those 
given during the initial and deception trials in Study One, as well as the initial trial in 
Study Two.  Once again, explanations referring to perceptual features of objects were the 
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most common (M = .36, SD = .29).  These responses focused on the material that the 
object was made out of (“Because it’s glass and it’s not plastic and glass is more valuable 
than plastic”) and the size of the object (“well, it’s big and round”).  Children also gave 
explanations that included comparisons of two of more objects (e.g., “It wouldn’t be as 
much as a necklace ”) as well as comparisons to how they previously rated the object in 
the experiment (e.g., “five. This is what I said first and I’m still going to stick with it 
now”).  Obvious explanations also included references to the functional affordances of 
objects (M = .35, SD = .35). For example, “because people could use it for eating” and 
“because it will keep you from getting your hand burned”.  Another type of explanation 
focused on the commonality of the objects (M = .28, SD = .33).  Participants noted they 
did not give the objects a high value rating, “because it’s probably like some you have at 
home” and “because it’s just a bowl.”  
 Obvious explanations were not the only explanation type seen in the deception 
trial; some children also gave non-obvious explanations.  However, like in Study One, the 
non-obvious explanations given in the deception trial were dissimilar to the ones given 
during the authentic trial.  Rather than focusing on the authenticity of the objects, the 
non-obvious explanations given during the deception trial focused on the object’s 
inauthentic nature (M = .15, SD = .27).  For example children indicated that an object had 
a certain value, “because it didn’t belong to George Washington and it’s just a bowl” and 
“cause it doesn’t belong to a president and now it’s just a plain old oven mitt.” Another 
participants noted of the objects, “It’s just a plain slinky now.”  So while the participants 
were still reasoning about the authentic nature of the given object, they were highlighting 
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that the object had dropped in value because it no longer belonged to that famous 
individual and had lost its associative essence.  
 There were also a number of explanations that did not fall into either the obvious 
or non-obvious categories and were non-explanatory in nature (M = .19, SD = .33).  For 
example, “because it’s in-between” and “because it’s not that expensive.” Other 
responses that were included in this explanatory category included claims that the child 
didn’t know or cases in which the child didn’t give a response. Examples of these 
subcategories can be seen in Table 2. 
Summary of Explanation Results  
Taken together, these results show that there were overall differences in the types 
of explanations that participants gave during the initial, authentic, and deception trials. 
Specifically, whereas obvious responses dominated in the initial trial, children changed 
their explanations to focus on non-obvious features of the objects in the authentic trial.  
However, once informed of the inauthentic nature of the objects children returned to 
obvious explanations.  Interestingly, once again the results show that while a majority of 
the children did return to obvious responses in the deception trial, a significant number of 
children were also reasoning about the inauthentic nature of the objects.  
 Obvious responses, which dominated in the initial trial (M = .92, SD = .18) 
decreased significantly in the authentic trial (M = .15, SD = .29; t(30) = 13.008 p < .001).  
They were replaced by non-obvious responses, which had been almost completely non-
existent in the initial trial (M = .01, SD = .05) but became the majority of explanations in 
the authentic trial (M = .85, SD = .29; t(30) = -16.465, p < .001).  In the deception trial, 
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after the accidental violation of authenticity had been revealed, the number of obvious 
explanations increased significantly (M = .76, SD = .26; t(30) = -7.565, p < .001) while 
the number of non-obvious responses dropped significantly (M = .15, SD = .27; t(30) = 
10.973, p < .001).  These results demonstrate that I was correct in my hypotheses 
concerning the nature of the explanatory content across trials.  Information about the 
types of explanations given across trial can be seen in Figure 7.   
In total, 94% of children gave primarily obvious responses during the initial trial 
with the remaining children giving primarily non-explanatory responses or giving an 
equal number of non-explanatory and obvious responses.  None of the children gave 
primarily non-obvious explanations in the initial trial.  In the authentic trial, only 10% of 
the children gave primarily obvious responses.  A majority of children (81%) changed 
their responses to focus on non-obvious responses. In the deception trial, a majority of 
children (68%) changed their responses to once again primarily focus on the obvious 
features of the objects.  However, there were still a number of children (10%) who 
focused on non-obvious features of the objects in the form or reasoning about the objects’ 
inauthentic status. Information about the percentages of explanation types given across 
trials can be seen in Table 4. 
Comparison to Study 1 Results 
The object value ratings and explanations given in Study Two did not differ from 
those given in Study One.  A 3(trial) by 1(Study) repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
that there was no significant main effect of study and there was no significant interaction 
between study and trial.  This is significant in that it highlights that despite the 
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differences in the type of deception employed by the researchers, participants in both 
studies still gave the same value ratings.  It suggests that the decrease in value ratings 
seen in Study One was not the result of methodological constraints, but was instead 
driven by the object’s loss of its authentic status.  An additional repeated measures 
ANOVA examining the number of non-obvious responses across the three trials with 
study as the between subjects variable demonstrated no significant differences in the 
frequency and pattern of non-obvious explanations across studies. Taken together, these 
results demonstrate that the findings in Study Two supported the findings found in Study 
One. Specifically, Study Two determined that children’s reactions to changes in 
authenticity status are independent of the way in which they have been informed of this 
change.   
Discussion 
 Study Two demonstrated that children are sensitive to violations of authenticity 
even when the violation is the result of a mistake rather than a deliberate deception.  Just 
as was demonstrated in Study One, object value ratings increased from the initial trial to 
the authentic trial indicating that the object ratings increased due to the presentation of 
information about authenticity.  This reasoning was also present in the explanation data. 
Whereas in the initial trial children used obvious features such as function and perceptual 
features to explain their ratings, they changed their explanations to focus on non-obvious 
features such as ownership to explain their higher ratings in the authentic trial.  
 Despite the fact that the deception in Study Two was the result of a mistake rather 
than a deliberate deception, object ratings decreased from the authentic trial to the 
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deception trial after information about the violation was presented.  This demonstrates 
that children are sensitive to violations of authenticity regardless of the nature of those 
violations.  This is significant because it shows us that children were not simply 
decreasing their scores because of their objections to being lied to.   This shows that 
children are decreasing their scores due to the violation alone, and presumably due to the 
absence of the associative essence of the owner.  Explanations in the deception trial 
closely resembled those given in the initial trial. Whereas responses in the authentic trial 
focused on non-obvious features, explanations in the initial and deception trials focused 
almost exclusively on obvious ones.  However, there were a number of sophisticated 
explanations given in the study in which children stated that they gave lower scores in the 
deception trial specifically because the object did not really belong to the previously 
indicated owner.   
 Object ratings in the deception trial were significantly lower than the ratings given 
in the initial trial. This was true for Study One as well as Study Two, implying that this 
rating difference was not driven by the nature of the deception (the lie) and could instead 
be indicative of associative essence loss.  Taken together, this study supports the claim 
that children are sensitive to violations in authenticity and thus sensitive to the presence 
or absence of associative essences.  
General Discussion 
The primary goal of this paper was to assess whether elementary school aged 
children are sensitive to changes in the authenticity status of objects.  The present studies 
found that children in this age group conceive of authenticity as something that can be 
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gained or lost, as shown by their willingness to increase and decrease the value rating 
scores of the objects when presented with information about the object’s authenticity.  
Furthermore, this research demonstrated that children are sophisticated in their reasoning 
about authenticity and authenticity violations.  This is demonstrated by explanations in 
which the participants indicated that it was the famous figure’s personal interactions with 
the objects that drove up the value score, and that the lack of this connection is what 
drove the value rating down after the violation.   
In the initial trials in both studies, children gave objects mid-ranged scores and 
justified those scores based on obvious features of the object, such as the way it is used or 
what it looks like.  Once information about the authenticity of the object was given to the 
participants their scores increased significantly and their explanations changed from 
focusing on obvious features to focusing on the individual history of the object.  This is 
significant in that it reflects that children changed how they perceived the worth of an 
object based on the history of the object alone.  The object stayed perceptually identical 
between the initial and the authenticity trial, but children reasoned that the individual 
history of an object (in the form of ownership) could raise the value of an object.   
When children were informed that the objects in question did not belong to the 
stated figures, their value ratings for the objects dropped significantly.  This was true 
regardless of whether the authenticity violation was the result of a deliberate deception 
(Study One) or an accident on the part of the experimenter (Study Two).  Not only did 
children’s scores decrease after the exposure of the violation, but their explanations 
changed as well.  A majority returned to a focus on obvious features reminiscent of the 
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responses given during the initial trial before any information about the authentic status 
of the object was presented.  The explanations in the deception trials that did focus on 
non-obvious qualities focused on the loss of ownership as a reason for the decrease in 
value rating scores.  While there were a few children who chose not to increase or 
decrease their value rating scores between trials (typically implying in their explanations 
that the prices of objects are fixed) most children demonstrated flexibility in their value 
ratings, showing the malleability of the presence or absence of an associative essence.  
This research suggests that the type of deception involved in the authenticity 
violation does not seem to affect children’s value ratings of the objects.  Despite the 
differences in deception type, children in both Study One and Study Two decreased their 
value ratings of objects after the violation of authenticity.  This supports the idea that the 
decrease in value ratings seen after an authenticity violation are reflective of how 
children think about changes in authenticity status, and are not merely the result of the 
methodology used in this study.   
One unexpected result found in these studies was that the deception scores were 
either marginally or significantly lower than the initial scores in both Study One and 
Study Two respectively.  An examination of adult behavior might be able to explain why 
this might be the case.  For example, when a painting in a museum is discovered to be a 
deliberate forgery, it does not remain in the museum for audiences to admire -- it is 
removed from the museum gallery.  This closely parallels the results of the present 
studies, in which both accidental and deliberate authenticity violations resulted in the 
same response: The devaluing of the formerly authentic object.  It is possible that this 
 61 
effect may be the result of a kind of ‘fraud penalty.’ In other words, it is possible that 
children lowered the scores of the objects in the deception trial not only because of the 
removal of the essence, but also because of the information that the first experimenter 
had not been truthful about the origins of the objects. If this is the case, than deception in 
both forms (whether it be deliberate or accidental) may have been enough to cause a 
decrease the price of the objects, even if only by a small amount. Even though this is 
merely speculative due to the small size of the effect, it is something that we hope to 
examine more in future studies.  
The results of this series of studies are in line with prior research (e.g., Frazier & 
Gelman, 2009) that showed that children have sophisticated concepts of authenticity.  
However, this research goes beyond these previous studies to demonstrate that children 
view authenticity as something that an object can gain or lose. This concept supports my 
hypothesis about the role of associative essences as the basis for reasoning about 
authenticity. This paper proposed that authentic objects are perceived to be ‘special’ 
because of the belief that these objects pick up the associative essences of past owners 
and past environments.  This novel concept helps to explain why objects are valued for 
their associations with people, places, or times of some significance. Importantly, this 
theoretical interpretation helps pull together prior work in this field, particularly studies 
focusing on positive and celebrity contagions (e.g., Newman, Diesendruck, & Bloom, 
2011). By providing a possible theoretical underpinning of how we reason about these 
concepts, I hope to inspire additional research in the future.  
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In sum, this study demonstrated that children are aware that the authenticity of an 
object is not ‘fixed,’ but rather can change depending on what an individual knows about 
an object.  This builds on previous research that has demonstrated that children value 
authentic objects in ways similar to adults, but adds to it by giving a clearer picture as to 
how children actually conceive of that authenticity. Specifically, previous research with 
children has been limited in that, so far, it has only demonstrated that children understand 
that authentic objects exist. For example, Frazier and Gelman (2009) demonstrated that 
children understand that authentic objects are worth more than inauthentic objects, but it 
does not tell us how children are conceiving of that authenticity. Hood and Bloom (2008) 
go further to demonstrate that children are aware that authenticity is a unique property of 
individual objects that does not transfer necessarily transfer to all other objects within a 
given category, but this study is limited in that they did not ask children for explanations 
as to why children gave specific responses.  
The present study goes beyond the previous literature in several specific ways. 
First, even though it is possible that children may have learned about the ‘specialness’ of 
authentic objects from their parents, it is less likely that they would have learned about 
forgery. In this way, the methodology used in this study may have gone beyond whatever 
prior knowledge about authenticity children may have gained from interactions with their 
parents. Secondly, rather than merely asking children whether or not they thought that 
authentic objects were worth more than inauthentic objects, we also asked them why. 
Asking participants about their reasoning behind their value judgments has given 
enormous insight into how children conceive of authenticity. In particular, the 
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sophistication of the children’s responses demonstrates that they conceive of authenticity 
in ways much closer to adults than previously shown by related studies in this field. 
Lastly, this study goes beyond previous studies in that it gives information about how 
children actually conceive of the authenticity of objects, rather than simply demonstrating 
that children are aware of its existence. This study shows that children believe 
authenticity to be a malleable property of objects. That it is not something that is fixed 
and inherent to an object but rather something that an object can gain and lose. This is 
significant in that it greatly expands our understanding of authenticity, and provides 
further evidence that we conceive of authenticity as an essence that an object can gain 
and lose.   
Alternative Explanations and Future Research 
Looking at the results of the two studies a different way, it is still possible that 
children felt an implicit pressure to change their ratings between trials.  It could be that 
receiving more information in general about an object is what drives its value up, and that 
removing this information is what causes the price to decrease.  I believe that this is 
generally not the case, as evidenced by the small number of children who did not change 
their value rating for any of the objects.  Additionally, this hypothesis does not explain 
the slight decrease in value ratings from the initial trial to the final trial.  Even so, this is 
an important concern that will be addressed in future studies.  
As a future research direction, I would like to examine the differences in 
explanations for the modern and the historical authentic items.  Observing the current 
explanation data for the authenticity trial, there were explanations that were only seen for 
 64 
the historical items but not the modern items, and vice versa.  For the historical items, 
there were a number of explanations that appealed to the rarity or age of the objects. 
These responses stressed that the object would be worth a lot because the items were hard 
to get and because they were very old. Children did not give this type of response for the 
modern objects.  For the modern objects however, children made note that even though 
the modern figures were famous, they were not quite as famous as the historical figures.  
I found this to be surprising due to the prevalence of popular media (e.g., the Disney 
Channel) for elementary school aged children.   Children may be more familiar with the 
modern figures (because they had seen them on TV and in movies) and less familiar with 
the historical figures, which they may have only heard of in history class.  However, the 
opposite was found in this study, and from the content of the explanations it seems clear 
that children as young as seven are able to put aside their feelings about the popularity of 
a character in order to consider who might be more famous to the population at large.  I 
plan to examine the differences between perceptions of modern and historical artifacts in 
follow-up work.   
The present studies examined children seven to nine years of age, however it is 
possible that younger children could show similar results.  In a follow up study I plan to 
use a similar methodology to examine if children between the ages of five and six will 
also show increases and decreases in value to correlate with gains or losses of associative 
essences.  I would also like to examine how children view inauthentic ‘copies.’ 
Companies that market to children rely on the idea that putting a picture of a popular 
figure (e.g., Justin Beiber) on the front of the product will increase sales. I am interested 
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in determining if children believe that these objects, which are merely associated with the 
famous figure, are as valuable as objects that actually belonged to the famous figure.    
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Explanation 
Type 
Description Included 
Explanations 
Example 
Obvious 
Explanations 
Refer to features of 
the object that can 
be directly observed 
Functional, 
Feature-based, 
Common 
“Because you can 
use it for cooking,”  
 
“Because it has 
polka-dots,”  
 
“Because there are 
lots of oven-mitts” 
Non-obvious 
Explanations 
 
 
 
Refer to features of 
an object that cannot 
be observed, such as 
an objects’ history 
or origins 
Authenticity-based, 
 Violation of 
authenticity-based 
“He was a famous 
person, it would be 
cool to touch 
something he 
touched,”  
 
“Because it didn’t 
belong to President 
Lincoln” 
Non-explanatory Additional 
responses 
Non-explanatory, 
Unknown 
“Because I don’t 
think it’s worth a 
lot”  
Table 1: Obvious and Non-obvious Explanation Types  
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Table 2: Subcategories of Obvious and Non-obvious explanation types 
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 Obvious Non-Obvious Non-Explanatory 
Initial Trial  91% 0% 3% 
Authentic Trial  9% 76% 3% 
Deception Trial  64% 15% 6% 
Table 3. Study 1: Percentage of explanation types across trial by participants.  
Percentages not reflected in this table include participants who did not have a majority of 
obvious, non-obvious, or non-explanatory response types.   
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 Obvious Non-Obvious Non-Explanatory 
Initial Trial  94% 0% 3% 
Authentic Trial  10% 81% 3% 
Deception Trial  68% 10% 13% 
Table 4. Study 2: Percentage of explanation types across trial by participants.  
Percentages not reflected in this table include participants who did not have a majority of 
obvious, non-obvious, or non-explanatory response types.   
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Figure 1: Stimuli used in Study 1 and Study 2 
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Figure 2: Experimental Design for Studies 1 and 2.  
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Figure 3: Example Pictures of Figures used in Study 1 and Study 2 
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Figure 4: Study 1: Average value ratings across trials 
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Figure 5: Study 1: Explanation types across trials 
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Figure 6: Study 2: Average value ratings across trials 
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Figure 7: Study 2: Explanation types across trials 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Study 1 Script  
PART 1: INTRODUCE AUTHENTIC FIGURES  
 
Say: Before we get started I want to ask you some questions 
Show a picture of Authentic Figure 1 and place it on the table in front of the child.  
Say: Do you know who this is? Wait for the child to answer 
If the child answers correctly, say: That’s right. This is X 
If the child answers incorrectly, say: Actually, This is X. Do you know who s/he 
is? Wait for child to answer 
If the child says that s/he doesn’t know or if she doesn’t respond, say: This is X 
Do you know  who s/he is? Wait for child to answer 
Say:  What can you tell me about X? Wait for the child to answer. You are looking for 
the child to give you information similar to the information written on the envelope.  
If the child gives the correct answer, say: That’s right! X was/is ____ then recite 
the statement about the character that is on the envelope. 
If the child gives the wrong answer, say: Well, actually, X was/is ___ then recite 
the statement about the character that is on the envelope. Then gesture to the 
picture and again ask: Do you know who s/he is? 
If the child does now know who the figure is or doesn’t answer, say: X was/is ___ 
then recite the statement about the character that is on the envelope. Then gesture 
to the picture and again ask: Do you know who s/he is? 
  If the child says yes or makes a positive gesture, say: yes? Ok.   
  If the child says no or makes a negative gesture, say: no? Ok.  
 
REPEAT THIS FOR ALL HISTORICAL FIGURES AND MODERN FIGURES THAT 
WERE INDICATED BY THE PARENT. WHEN YOU HAVE FOUND TWO 
HISTORICAL FIGURES AND TWO MODERN FIGURES THAT THE CHILD 
KNOWS, WRITE THOSE FOUR INDIVIDUALS ON THE STUDY INFORMATION 
SHEET 
 
PULL THE CHOSEN FIGURES OUT OF THEIR ENVELOPES AND ARRANGE 
THEM IN ORDER OF THEIR PRESENTATION  
 
PART 2: TRAINING 
 
Say: We are going to play a game where I’m going to ask you to tell me how much 
you think different things are worth.  
Place number line on the table and turn it to face the child 
Say:  This is a number line and I’m going to use it to say how much I think different 
things are worth. Do you see how the number line goes from 1 to 10? Well, 10 means 
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that something is worth a lot point to the number ten, 1 means that something is 
worth a little point to the number 1.  
Say: So higher numbers means that something is worth more point to the number 5 
and then trace along the number line to the number 10, and lower numbers means that 
something is worth less point to the number 5 and then trace along the number line to 
the number 1.  
Say: Let me show you how it works.  
 
Place the Necklace on the table. 
Say: Look at this! This is a necklace! I bet it is worth a lot! I think that it is worth 10 
point to the number 10 on the number line because that is the highest. Take the necklace 
off of the table 
 
Place the paperclip on the table. 
Say: Look at this. This is a paperclip. I don’t think it is worth very much. I’m going 
to say that it is only worth 1 point to the number 1 on the number line because that is 
the lowest. Take the paperclip off the table 
 
Place the stuffed animal on the table.  
Say: Look at this! This is a stuffed animal. It is definitely worth more than the 
paperclip. But I don’t think it is worth as much as the necklace. I am going to say 
that it is worth 5 point to the number 5 on the number line because it is right in the 
middle. Take the stuffed animal off of the table 
 
RA1: Ok, now it is your turn to tell me how much some things are worth. I am going 
to place an object on the table and I want you to tell me how much you think it is 
worth by pointing to a number on the number line point to the paper with the number 
line. Ok? Let’s go. 
 
Place the cup on the table and point to it. 
Say: Look at this! This is a cup! How much do you think this cup is worth? Show me 
by pointing to a number on the number line. Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is 
the lowest. 
If the child points to a number, say: ok! Let’s keep going and then continue with 
the practice session.  
If the child does not give a response, say: You can tell me how much you think 
this is worth by pointing to a number on the number line point to the number 
line. The higher numbers means that it is worth more point at 5 and move your 
finger up to 10, and the lower numbers means that it is worth less point at 5 
and move your finger to 1. 
If the child still doesn’t answer, say: It’s ok. I just want to know how you think 
about this. There is no right or wrong answer. Just tell me what you think.  
After the child has rated the object, Say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
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Remove the cup 
 
Place the pen cap on the table.  
Say: Look at this! This is a pen cap. How much do you think this pen cap is worth? 
Show me by pointing to a number on the number line. Remember, 10 is the highest 
and 1 is the lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, Say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove the pen cap 
 
Place a stuffed animal on the table.  
Say: Look at this! This is a stuffed animal. How much do you think this stuffed 
animal is worth? Show me by pointing to a number on the number line. Remember, 
10 is the highest and 1 is the lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove the stuffed animal from the table  
 
Say: Ok. Now I am going to show you some different objects.  
 
PART THREE: RATING THE OBJECTS WITHOUT INFORMATION 
 
NOTE: THIS SECTION SHOULD BE PRESENTED IN A RANDOMIZED ORDER 
DETERMINED BEFORE THE START OF THE STUDY.  
 
HISTORICAL OBJECT-BOWL 
Place the bowl on the table  
Say: Look at this! This is a bowl. How much do you think this bowl is worth?  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Show me by pointing to a number on 
the number line.   
If they continue to struggle, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is the 
lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove the bowl from the table.  
 
HISTORICAL OBJECT- OVEN MITT 
Place the oven mitt on the table  
Say: Look at this! This is an oven mitt. How much do you think this oven mitt is 
worth?  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Show me by pointing to a number on 
the number line.   
If they continue to struggle, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is the 
lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove the oven mitt from the table. 
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MODERN OBJECT- SLINKY 
Place the slinky on the table  
Say: Look at this! This is a slinky. How much do you think this slinky is worth?  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Show me by pointing to a number on 
the number line.   
If they continue to struggle, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is the 
lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove the slinky from the table. 
 
MODERN OBJECT- PIG DOLL 
Place the pig doll on the table.  
Say: Look at this! This is a pig doll. How much do you think this pig doll is worth?  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Show me by pointing to a number on 
the number line.   
If they continue to struggle, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is the 
lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove the pig doll from the table. 
 
PART 4: RATING THE AUTHENTIC OBJECTS 
 
NOTE: PRESENT THESE OBJECTS IN THE SAME ORDER AS ABOVE 
 
NOTE: IF THE CHILD EVER ASKS SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF “DID THIS 
REALLY BELONG TO X?” THE ANSWER IS “YES!” 
 
Say: I’m going to tell you a little bit more about all of these things.  
 
HISTORICAL OBJECT-BOWL 
Place the bowl back onto the table 
Say: Now let me tell you a little more about this bowl. This bowl belonged to X.  
Show the picture of X and then place the picture in front of the bowl 
Say: Before you said this bowl was worth X. So now how much do you think this 
bowl is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was before, or less 
than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is 
the lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Take the bowl off the table 
 
HISTORICAL OBJECT-OVEN MITT 
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Place the oven mitt back onto the table 
Say: Now let me tell you a little more about this oven mitt. This oven mitt belonged 
to X.  Show the picture of X and then place the picture in front of the oven mitt.  
Say: Before you said this oven mitt was worth X. So now how much do you think 
this oven mitt is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was 
before, or less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is 
the lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Take the oven mitt off the table 
 
MODERN OBJECT- SLINKY 
Place the slinky back onto the table 
Say: Now let me tell you a little more about this slinky. This slinky belonged to X.  
Show the picture of X and then place the picture in front of the slinky.  
Say: Before you said this slinky was worth X. So now how much do you think this 
slinky is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was before, or 
less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is 
the lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Take the slinky off the table 
 
MODERN OBJECT-PIG DOLL 
Place the pig doll back onto the table 
Say: Now let me tell you a little more about this pig doll. This pig doll belonged to X.  
Show the picture of X and then place the picture in front of the pig doll.  
Say: Before you said this pig doll was worth X. So now how much do you think this 
pig doll is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was before, or 
less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is 
the lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Take the pig doll off the table 
 
Say: So, I have to go and grab something now, but my friend will be here in a second 
Leave the room 
The second RA should enter the room after only a 5-10 second delay 
 
PART 5: EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION: PURPOSEFUL CONDITION 
(PRESENTED BY RA2)  
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NOTE: THERE SHOULD ONLY BE A 5-10 SECOND DELAY BETWEEN WHEN 
THE FIRST RA LEAVES THE ROOM AND THE SECOND RA ENTERS 
 
NOTE: THE PRESENTATION ORDER HERE IS THE SAME AS BEFORE 
 
Say: So I was just talking with (name of first RA) who you were talking to, and I 
have some bad news. She told you that some of the things that you saw belonged to 
some people, but that actually isn’t true. It was actually a lie. She knew that those 
things did not really belong to those people, she knew it the whole time. She told you 
a lie and she did it on purpose. Let’s take another look at those things.  
 
HISTORICAL OBJECT-BOWL 
Place the bowl back onto the table 
Say: Do you see this bowl? Before (1st RA) told you that it belonged to X place a 
picture of X in front of the bowl but she lied to you and it doesn’t. Take away the 
picture of X.  
Say: Before, you said that this bowl was worth X. So now how much do you think 
this bowl is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was before, or 
less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove bowl from the table  
 
HISTORICAL OBJECT-OVEN MITT 
Place the oven mitt back onto the table 
Say: Do you see this oven mitt? Before (1st RA) told you that it belonged to X place a 
picture of X in front of the oven mitt but she lied to you and it doesn’t. Take away the 
picture of X.  
Say: Before, you said that this oven mitt was worth X. So now how much do you 
think this oven mitt is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was 
before, or less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove oven mitt from the table  
 
MODERN OBJECT-SLINKY 
Place the slinky back onto the table 
Say: Do you see this slinky? Before (1st RA) told you that it belonged to X place a 
picture of X in front of the slinky but she lied to you and it doesn’t. Take away the 
picture of X.  
Say: Before, you said that this slinky was worth X. So now how much do you think 
this slinky is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was before, 
or less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove slinky from the table  
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MODERN OBJECT-PIG DOLL 
Place the pig doll back onto the table 
Say: Do you see this pig doll? Before (1st RA) told you that it belonged to X place a 
picture of X in front of the pig doll but she lied to you and it doesn’t. Take away the 
picture of X.  
Say: Before, you said that this pig doll was worth X. So now how much do you think 
this pig doll is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was before, 
or less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove pig doll from the table  
 
Say:  You did a great job! Thanks for playing with me!  
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Appendix B: Study 2 Script  
NOTE: The script for Study 2 is identical to the script from Study 1 until Part 5 of the 
script.  
 
PART 1: INTRODUCE AUTHENTIC FIGURES  
 
Say: Before we get started I want to ask you some questions 
Show a picture of Authentic Figure 1 and place it on the table in front of the child.  
Say: Do you know who this is? Wait for the child to answer 
 If the child answers correctly, say: That’s right. This is X 
If the child answers incorrectly, say: Actually, This is X. Do you know who s/he 
is? Wait for child to answer 
If the child says that s/he doesn’t know or if she doesn’t respond, say: This is X 
Do you know  who s/he is? Wait for child to answer 
Say:  What can you tell me about X? Wait for the child to answer. You are looking for 
the child to give you information similar to the information written on the envelope.  
If the child gives the correct answer, say: That’s right! X was/is ____ then recite 
the statement about the character that is on the envelope. 
If the child gives the wrong answer, say: Well, actually, X was/is ___ then recite 
the statement about the character that is on the envelope. Then gesture to the 
picture and again ask: Do you know who s/he is? 
If the child does now know who the figure is or doesn’t answer, say: X was/is ___ 
then recite the statement about the character that is on the envelope. Then gesture 
to the picture and again ask: Do you know who s/he is? 
  If the child says yes or makes a positive gesture, say: yes? Ok.   
  If the child says no or makes a negative gesture, say: no? Ok.  
 
REPEAT THIS FOR ALL HISTORICAL FIGURES AND MODERN FIGURES THAT 
WERE INDICATED BY THE PARENT. WHEN YOU HAVE FOUND TWO 
HISTORICAL FIGURES AND TWO MODERN FIGURES THAT THE CHILD 
KNOWS, WRITE THOSE FOUR INDIVIDUALS ON THE STUDY INFORMATION 
SHEET 
 
PULL THE CHOSEN FIGURES OUT OF THEIR ENVELOPES AND ARRANGE 
THEM IN ORDER OF THEIR PRESENTATION  
 
PART 2: TRAINING 
 
Say: We are going to play a game where I’m going to ask you to tell me how much 
you think different things are worth.  
Place number line on the table and turn it to face the child 
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Say:  This is a number line and I’m going to use it to say how much I think different 
things are worth. Do you see how the number line goes from 1 to 10? Well, 10 means 
that something is worth a lot point to the number ten, 1 means that something is 
worth a little point to the number 1.  
Say: So higher numbers means that something is worth more point to the number 5 
and then trace along the number line to the number 10, and lower numbers means that 
something is worth less point to the number 5 and then trace along the number line to 
the number 1. Let me show you how it works.  
 
Place the Necklace on the table. 
Say: Look at this! This is a necklace! I bet it is worth a lot! I think that it is worth 10 
point to the number 10 on the number line because that is the highest. Take the necklace 
off of the table 
 
Place the paperclip on the table. 
Say: Look at this. This is a paperclip. I don’t think it is worth very much. I’m going 
to say that it is only worth 1 point to the number 1 on the number line because that is 
the lowest. Take the paperclip off the table 
 
Place the stuffed animal on the table.  
Say: Look at this! This is a stuffed animal. It is definitely worth more than the 
paperclip. But I don’t think it is worth as much as the necklace. I am going to say 
that it is worth 5 point to the number 5 on the number line because it is right in the 
middle. Take the stuffed animal off of the table 
 
RA1: Ok, now it is your turn to tell me how much some things are worth. I am going 
to place an object on the table and I want you to tell me how much you think it is 
worth by pointing to a number on the number line point to the paper with the number 
line. Ok? Let’s go. 
 
Place the cup on the table and point to it. 
Say: Look at this! This is a cup! How much do you think this cup is worth? Show me 
by pointing to a number on the number line. Remember, 5 is the highest and 1 is the 
lowest. 
If the child points to a number, say: ok! Let’s keep going and then continue with 
the practice session.  
If the child does not give a response, say: You can tell me how much you think 
this is worth by pointing to a number on the number line point to the number 
line. The higher numbers means that it is worth more point at 5 and move your 
finger up to 10, and the lower numbers means that it is worth less point at 5 
and move your finger to 1. 
If the child still doesn’t answer, say: It’s ok. I just want to know how you think 
about this. There is no right or wrong answer. Just tell me what you think 
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After the child has rated the object, Say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove the cup 
 
 Place the pen cap on the table.  
Say: Look at this! This is a pen cap. How much do you think this pen cap is worth? 
Show me by pointing to a number on the number line. Remember, 10 is the highest 
and 1 is the lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, Say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove the pen cap 
 
 Place a stuffed animal on the table.  
Say: Look at this! This is a stuffed animal. How much do you think this stuffed 
animal is worth? Show me by pointing to a number on the number line. Remember, 
10 is the highest and 1 is the lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove the stuffed animal from the table  
 
Say: Ok. Now I am going to show you some different objects.  
 
PART THREE: RATING THE OBJECTS WITHOUT INFORMATION 
 
NOTE: THIS SECTION SHOULD BE PRESENTED IN A RANDOMIZED ORDER 
DETERMINED BEFORE THE START OF THE STUDY.  
 
HISTORICAL OBJECT-BOWL 
Place the bowl on the table  
Say: Look at this! This is a bowl. How much do you think this bowl is worth?  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Show me by pointing to a number on 
the number line.  
If they continue to struggle, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is the 
lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove the bowl from the table.  
 
HISTORICAL OBJECT- OVEN MITT 
Place the oven mitt on the table  
Say: Look at this! This is an oven mitt. How much do you think this oven mitt is 
worth?  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Show me by pointing to a number on 
the number line.  
If they continue to struggle, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is the 
lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
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Remove the oven mitt from the table. 
 
MODERN OBJECT- SLINKY 
Place the slinky on the table  
Say: Look at this! This is a slinky. How much do you think this slinky is worth?  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Show me by pointing to a number on 
the number line.   
If they continue to struggle, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is the 
lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove the slinky from the table. 
 
MODERN OBJECT- PIG DOLL 
Place the pig doll on the table.  
Say: Look at this! This is a pig doll. How much do you think this pig doll is worth?  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Show me by pointing to a number on 
the number line.   
If they continue to struggle, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is the 
lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove the pig doll from the table. 
 
PART 4: RATING THE AUTHENTIC OBJECTS 
 
NOTE: PRESENT THESE OBJECTS IN THE SAME ORDER AS ABOVE 
 
NOTE: IF THE CHILD EVER ASKS SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF “DID THIS 
REALLY BELONG TO X?” THE ANSWER IS “YES!” 
 
Say: I’m going to tell you a little bit more about all of these things.  
 
HISTORICAL OBJECT-BOWL 
Place the bowl back onto the table 
Say: Now let me tell you a little more about this bowl. This bowl belonged to X.  
Show the picture of X and then place the picture in front of the bowl 
Say: Before you said this bowl was worth X. So now how much do you think this 
bowl is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was before, or less 
than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is 
the lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Take the bowl off the table 
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HISTORICAL OBJECT-OVEN MITT 
Place the oven mitt back onto the table 
Say: Now let me tell you a little more about this oven mitt. This oven mitt belonged 
to X.  Show the picture of X and then place the picture in front of the oven mitt.  
Say: Before you said this oven mitt was worth X. So now how much do you think 
this oven mitt is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was 
before, or less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is 
the lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Take the oven mitt off the table 
 
MODERN OBJECT- SLINKY 
Place the slinky back onto the table 
Say: Now let me tell you a little more about this slinky. This slinky belonged to X.  
Show the picture of X and then place the picture in front of the slinky.  
Say: Before you said this slinky was worth X. So now how much do you think this 
slinky is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was before, or 
less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is 
the lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Take the slinky off the table 
 
MODERN OBJECT-PIG DOLL 
Place the pig doll back onto the table 
Say: Now let me tell you a little more about this pig doll. This pig doll belonged to X.  
Show the picture of X and then place the picture in front of the pig doll.  
Say: Before you said this pig doll was worth X. So now how much do you think this 
pig doll is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was before, or 
less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
If the child struggles with the task, say: Remember, 10 is the highest and 1 is 
the lowest.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Take the pig doll off the table 
 
Say: So, I have to go and grab something now, but my friend will be here in a second 
Leave the room 
The second RA should enter the room after only a 5-10 second delay 
 
PART 5: EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION: MISTAKE CONDITION (FOR RA2)  
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NOTE: THERE SHOULD ONLY BE A 5-10 SECOND DELAY BETWEEN WHEN 
THE FIRST RA LEAVES THE ROOM AND THE SECOND RA ENTERS 
 
NOTE: THE PRESENTATION ORDER HERE IS THE SAME AS BEFORE 
 
Say: So I was just talking with (name of first RA) who you were talking to, and I 
have some bad news. She told you that some of the things that you saw belonged to 
some people, but that actually isn’t true. It was actually a big mistake. She really 
thought that those things belonged to those people, and she just found out right now 
that they didn’t really belong to them. She told me to tell you that she is really sorry. 
She made a mistake but she didn’t do it on purpose. Let’s take another look at those 
things.  
 
HISTORICAL OBJECT-BOWL 
Place the bowl back onto the table 
Say: Do you see this bowl? Before (1st RA) told you that it belonged to X place a 
picture of X in front of the bowl but she made a mistake and it doesn’t take away the 
picture of X.  
Say: Before, you said that this bowl was worth X. So now how much do you think 
this bowl is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was before, or 
less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove bowl from the table  
 
HISTORICAL OBJECT-OVEN MITT 
Place the oven mitt back onto the table 
Say: Do you see this oven mitt? Before (1st RA) told you that it belonged to X place a 
picture of X in front of the oven mitt but she made a mistake and it doesn’t take away 
the picture of X.  
Say: Before, you said that this oven mitt was worth X. So now how much do you 
think this oven mitt is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was 
before, or less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove oven mitt from the table  
 
MODERN OBJECT-SLINKY 
Place the slinky back onto the table 
Say: Do you see this slinky? Before (1st RA) told you that it belonged to X place a 
picture of X in front of the slinky but she made a mistake and it doesn’t take away the 
picture of X.  
Say: Before, you said that this slinky was worth X. So now how much do you think 
this slinky is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was before, 
or less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
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After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove slinky from the table  
 
MODERN OBJECT-PIG DOLL 
Place the pig doll back onto the table 
Say: Do you see this pig doll? Before (1st RA) told you that it belonged to X place a 
picture of X in front of the pig doll but she made a mistake and it doesn’t take away the 
picture of X.  
Say: Before, you said that this pig doll was worth X. So now how much do you think 
this pig doll is worth? Is it worth the same as it was before, more than it was before, 
or less than it was before? Show me using the number line.  
After the child has rated the object, say: Why do you think it is worth that much?  
Remove pig doll from the table  
 
Say:  You did a great job! Thanks for playing with me!  
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Appendix C: Historical and Modern Figure List 
Historical Figures:      Modern Figures:   
1. Abraham Lincoln (former president)   1. Will Smith (actor and singer)  
2. George Washington (first president)   2. Barack Obama (current president)   
3. Thomas Jefferson (former president)   3. Miley Cyrus (Hannah Montana)  
4. Benjamin Franklin (invented the lightning rod) 4. Selena Gomez (Wizards of Wav. Pl.) 
5. Thomas Edison (invented the light bulb)  5. Taylor Lautner (Twilight movies)  
6. Christopher Columbus (discovered America)  6. Nick Jonas (Jonas Brothers)  
7. Harriet Tubman (Underground Railroad)  7. Britney Spears (singer)  
8. Amelia Earhart (first female pilot)   8. Taylor Swift (singer)   
9. Helen Keller (deaf and blind author)   9. Simon Cowell (American Idol)  
10. Albert Einstein (scientist)    10. Justin Beiber (singer)     
11. Martin Luther King Jr. (Civil Rights leader)   11. Vanessa Hudgens (High School M.)  
12. Rosa Parks (civil right leader)   12. Zac Efron (High School Musical)                                           
13. John Adams (former president)                    13. Jack Black (Gulliver’s Travels)  
14. Alexander Graham Bell (invented the telephone) 14. Robert Pattinson (Twilight movies)  
15. Florence Nightingale (famous nurse)   15. Emma Watson (Harry Potter m.)  
16. Susan B. Anthony (fought for women’s rights) 16. Dylan Sprouse  (Suite life on deck) 
17. Marie Curie  (scientist)    17. Miranda Cosgrove (icarly) 
18. George Washington Carver (inventor)  18. Shia LaBaouf (Transformers m.) 
19. Cesar Chavez (fought for Mexican rights)  19. Kristen Stewart (Twilight movies)  
20. Anne Frank (wrote a diary in WW2)   20. Keke Palmer (True Jackson, VP) 
21. Booker T. Washington (fought for Afr. Amer.) 21. Daniel Radcliffe (Harry Potter m.) 
22. Ludwig Van Beethoven (musical composer)  22. Lady Gaga (singer) 
23. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (musical composer) 23. Victoria Justice (Victorious!)  
24. Eleanor Roosevelt (former first lady)  24. Katy Perry (singer) 
25. Annie Oakley (sharpshooter)   25. Bruno Mars (singer) 
26. Clara Barton (founded the Red Cross)  26. Peyton Manning (football player)  
27. Francis Scott Key (wrote the national anthem) 27. Michael Phelps (Olympic swimmer) 
28. Betsy Ross (made the first American flag)  28. Johnny Depp (Pirates Movies)  
29. Theodore Roosevelt (former president)  29. Joe Jonas (Camp Rock) 
30. Jackie Robinson (Af. Amer. baseball player)  30. Usher (singer) 
31. Elizabeth Blackwell (first female doctor)  31. Jaden Smith (The Karate Kid movie) 
32. Bessie Coleman (first Af. Amer. Pilot)  32. Danica Patrick (NASCAR driver) 
33. Charles Darwin (scientist)    33. Ashley Judd (Tooth Fairy movie) 
34. Emily Dickinson (poet and author)   34. Shaquille O’Neil (basketball player) 
35. Marco Polo (explorer)    35. Shaun White (Olym. snowboarder) 
36. Henry Ford (invented the ford car)   36. Lindsey Vonn (Olympic skier) 
37. Paul Revere (midnight ride)    37. Venus Williams (tennis player) 
       38. Fergie (singer) 
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